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Inadequate Protection: Examining the 
Due Process Rights of Individuals in 
Child Abuse and Neglect Registries 
Amanda S. Sen,* Stephanie K. Glaberson,** & Aubrey Rose*** 
Abstract 
This Article seeks to advance due process protections for 
people included in state child abuse and neglect registries. 
Between states, there are differences in the types of cases included 
in the state registry and the process required to be placed on or 
removed from the registry. To obtain judicial due process review, 
a plaintiff must demonstrate that a protected liberty or property 
interest is at stake. When federal courts have evaluated the 
individual liberty interest(s) implicated by placement on state 
child abuse and neglect registries, they have so far only found 
such an interest when the plaintiff’s employment opportunities 
were clearly affected. We identify a more principled method by 
which courts should evaluate challenges to state child abuse and 
neglect registries. Our proposed method would root the analysis 
in the core constitutional right of family integrity. We then go on 
to identify ways in which states could structure their child abuse 
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I. Introduction 
Databases, or “registries,” of individuals who purportedly 
pose some danger to the public are becoming increasingly 
common.1 Many states maintain lists of people convicted of 
certain categories of crimes, including sex crimes, arson, elder 
abuse, and methamphetamine-related offenses.2 The federal 
government maintains its own databases, including the 
classified “No Fly List” that requires airlines to deny access to 
flights to listed individuals,3 and widely-available databases 
such as the E-Verify program—also referred to as the “No Work 
List”—which allows an employer to check whether a job 
applicant is authorized to work in the United States.4  
In 1976, the Supreme Court considered the due process 
rights of an individual whose arrest (not conviction) for 
shoplifting was advertised to local businesses in a police flyer.5 
The Court determined that harm to reputation, alone, was not 
a deprivation of a protected liberty interest and did not warrant 
due process protections.6 The Court went on to develop the 
“stigma-plus” test to evaluate whether a state action harmed 
more than “mere reputation,” and therefore warranted due 
process protections.7 Much commentary and scholarship has 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 1. See Elizabeth Reiner Platt, Gangsters to Greyhounds: The Past, 
Present, and Future of Offender Registration, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
727, 728 (2013) (“Existing registries are expanding and becoming increasingly 
punitive.”). 
 2. See id. at 738 (“While the most recent wave of registries initially 
focused exclusively on sex crimes, the use of registries has begun to expand to 
include a number of additional crimes.”). 
 3. See Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735, 
1775– 76 (2015) (“The No Fly List maintained the names of individuals that 
air carriers were to deny transport.”). 
 4. See id. at 1763–64 (explaining that the E-Verify system attempts to 
“verify” the identity or citizenship status of a worker based upon complex 
statistical algorithms and multiple databases). 
 5. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 693 (1976) (“After [the shoplifting] 
charge had been dismissed respondent brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 against petitioner police chiefs, who had distributed the flyer to area 
merchants, alleging that petitioners’ action under color of law deprived him of 
his constitutional rights.”). 
 6. See id. at 701 (refusing to recognize reputation as a “candidate for 
special protection” by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 7. See id. at 706 (requiring “an accompanying loss of government 
employment” to raise reputation to a protected status). 
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criticized the Court’s narrowness in its consideration of liberty 
interests in Paul v. Davis8 and subsequent cases.9 Eric J. 
Mitnick recently argued that harm to reputation impacts a 
person’s privacy and liberty interests.10 Nevertheless, the bar to 
identifying a private liberty interest in a procedural due process 
claim remains high.11 While Professor Mitnick’s work has been 
cited by several litigants, it has not been substantively cited by 
a court.12  
There is little jurisprudence subsequent to Paul directly 
addressing the due process rights of individuals affected by 
being listed in the various state registries and databases. The 
E-Verify program produces a significant number of errors, 
impacting economically disadvantaged prospective workers, but 
it has not been subject to a significant due process challenge.13 
The Supreme Court heard a procedural due process claim 
regarding Connecticut’s sex offender registry in 2003, but the 
Court explicitly did not reach the question of whether the 
plaintiff was denied a liberty right, ruling that since 
Connecticut’s law did not imply continued dangerousness, only 
the fact of a conviction, procedural due process analysis was not 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 8. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
 9. See Nat Stern, Defamed but Retained Public Employees: Addressing 
a Gap in Due Process Jurisprudence, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 795, 797–99 (2003) 
(“Paul provoked an avalanche of criticism.”). 
 10. See Eric J. Mitnick, Procedural Due Process and Reputational Harm: 
Liberty as Self-Invention, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79, 82 (2009) (accusing the 
court of ignoring the notion that constitutional liberty relates to autonomy). 
 11. See Stern, supra note 9, at 800 (“The principle that the state must 
harm more than one’s reputation alone to violate the liberty shielded by due 
process is not well-settled.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 30, Lucas v. Office of the Colo. State 
Pub. Def., 70 F. App’x 700 (10th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-1378), 2017 WL 383130, at 
*29 (using Mitnick’s article to argue that the State “touched upon” the 
petitioner’s constitutional right to pursue intimate human relationships when 
it restricted his right to pursue relations with a co-worker). The Supreme 
Court of Vermont cited Mitnick’s article, but only to reference the stigma-plus 
standard. See Stone v. Town of Irasburg, 196 A.3d 769, 777 (Vt. 2014) (calling 
the stigma-plus formulation discussed in Mitnick’s article “widely accepted 
today as a constitutional analog to common law defamation”). 
 13. See Hu, supra note 3, at 1778–83 (2015) (“Experts have concluded 
that these factors together create a database screening system that is 
unreliable and inaccurate in its structure, both technologically and 
programmatically, as well a system that has led to widespread discriminatory 
results in its application.”). 
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necessary.14 The Eighth Circuit followed this reasoning and 
refused a similar due process claim.15 The Sixth Circuit 
addressed the question of whether reduced employment 
opportunities constituted a deprivation of liberty and concluded, 
“[a] charge that merely makes a plaintiff less attractive to other 
employers but leaves open a definite range of opportunity does 
not constitute a liberty deprivation.”16 
All states maintain child abuse and neglect registries: 
centralized databases of people accused of maltreating 
children.17 These registries are used to aid child protective 
investigations and maintain statistical information for federal 
funding.18 They also are used in many states for employment 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 14. See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2003) (“We 
therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals because due process 
does not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the 
State’s statutory scheme.”). 
 15. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 709 (8th Cir. 2005) (“States ‘are not 
barred by principles of “procedural due process” from drawing’ classifications 
among sex offenders and other individuals.” (quoting Conn. Dep’t of Pub. 
Safety, 538 U.S. at 8)). 
 16. Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 479 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing 
Gregory v. Hunt, 24 F.3d 781, 788 (6th Cir. 1994)). Interestingly, in Cutshall, 
the court stated, “Cutshall has not cited, and we have not found, any case 
recognizing a general right to private employment.” Id. at 479. However, at 
least one appellate court, the Second Circuit, had determined prior to Cutshall 
that a plaintiff’s liberty interests were disrupted by the state when placement 
on a child abuse and neglect registry impacted her private employment 
opportunities. See Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1002 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding 
that “Valmonte has adequately stated a cause of action for deprivation of a 
liberty interest” as her placement on a child abuse and neglect registry 
negatively impacted her employment opportunities). The Cutshall court also 
said that “[t]he Constitution does not provide Cutshall with a right to keep his 
registry information private, and the Act does not impose any restrictions on 
his personal rights that are fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty, such as his procreative or marital rights.” Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 481. 
 17. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, ESTABLISHMENT AND 
MAINTENANCE OF CENTRAL REGISTRIES FOR CHILD ABUSE OR NEGLECT REPORTS 
1 (2018), https://perma.cc/3XAP-GN5R (PDF) [hereinafter CHILD WELFARE 
INFO. GATEWAY, ESTABLISHMENT, AND MAINTENANCE] (“Every State has 
procedures for maintaining records related to reports and investigations of 
child abuse and neglect. The term ‘central registry’ is used . . . to refer to a 
centralized database for the statewide collection and maintenance of child 
abuse and neglect investigation records.”). 
 18. See id. (“Central registries and the systematic record keeping of child 
abuse and neglect reports assist child protective services in the identification 
and protection of abused and neglected children.”). 
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screening in the fields involving the care of children.19 Some 
states now operate these registries as online websites, which 
grant access to certain employers who submit screening 
requests for employees.20 Employers can conduct background 
checks on prospective employees and, in some cases, inquire on 
a regular basis about current employees.21 
Courts have been more willing to consider due process 
claims regarding child abuse and neglect registries than other 
types of registries, and the Courts of Appeals in both the Second 
and Ninth Circuits have ordered states to improve procedural 
due process protections for individuals placed on such 
registries.22 However, thus far, the courts have couched their 
decisions in terms of the impact of registration on the 
registrant’s employment rights, which leaves individuals 
impacted by child abuse and neglect registries but who are not 
employed in an impacted field without a clear claim to equal due 
process rights. 
Scholars have addressed the challenges of due process in 
the child abuse and neglect registry context, but these articles 
do not grapple with liberty protections for people whose 
employment is not clearly affected by placement on the 
registries, and their recommendations for due process 
improvements are now dated. In 1993, Michael R. Phillips 
argued that as states began opening access to registries to 
employers, stronger due process protections would be needed, 
and he made several interesting but cursory recommendations 
as to how to do so, including robust notice, timing, and 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 19. See id. (“Central registry records also are used to screen persons who 
will be entrusted with the care of children.”). 
 20. See, e.g., Agency Request, DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS.-CHILD PROTECTIVE 
SERVS. INFO. SYSTEM (CHILD ABUSE REGISTRY), https://perma.cc/V2PR-LSST 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2019) (allowing certain employers to submit a screening 
request to the Georgia Department of Human Services) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 21. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424-a(1)(b)(i)(A) (McKinney 2019) 
(stating that employers are required to inquire while hiring and permitted to 
inquire for current employees every six months). 
 22. See Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 1003–04 (discussing the insufficient due 
process protections afforded by the “some credible evidence” standard); 
Humphries v. Cty. of L.A., 554 F.3d 1170, 1188–90 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing 
the insufficient due process protections afforded to individuals placed on 
California’s Child Abuse Central Index). 
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evidentiary standards.23 Jill D. Moore wrote a fairly exhaustive 
overview of jurisprudence on due process and child abuse and 
neglect registries in 1995, but she concluded, we believe 
prematurely and erroneously, that the cost for individuals 
erroneously placed on a registry whose employment is not at 
risk is not high enough to be accorded substantial weight.24 
More recently, Shaudee Navid argued in the U.C. Davis Law 
Review that child abuse and neglect registries are more harmful 
to registrants than sex offender registries because registrants’ 
statuses on the registries are actively provided to employers by 
state agencies and some employers are required to check the 
registries before making employment decisions.25 Navid took for 
granted that the only relevant individual liberty interest to be 
considered was rooted in employment opportunities.26  
In Part II of this Article, we contend that the protections of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should 
not be tied only to an impact on employment. Since the Supreme 
Court has recognized parenting to be a fundamental right,27 and 
child abuse and neglect registries significantly alter that right, 
the “stigma-plus” standard is met and all parents listed on these 
registries are entitled to protection.28  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 23. See Michael R. Phillips, Note, The Constitutionality of 
Employer-Accessible Child Abuse Registries: Due Process Implications of 
Governmental Occupational Blacklisting, 92 MICH. L. REV. 139, 182–94 (1993) 
(arguing how states can apply procedural safeguards to create 
employer-accessible child abuse registries that afford protections in 
accordance with the Due Process Clause). 
 24. See Jill D. Moore, Charting a Course Between Scylla and Charybdis: 
Child Abuse Registries and Procedural Due Process, 73 N.C. L. REV. 2063, 
2113–14 (2019) (discussing how courts that view registries as protecting 
children who are current victims of neglect and abuse reduce the costs of a 
high risk of error as government intrusion into the family is warranted). 
 25. See Shaudee Navid, They’re Making a List, but Are They Checking It 
Twice? How Erroneous Placement on Child Offender Databases Offends Due 
Process, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1641, 1659–66 (2011) (arguing “child abuser 
databases create everlasting negative and societal effects” as these databases 
are disseminated to employers and licensing agencies, unlike sex offender 
registries) (citing Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2003) and 
Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 999–1001). 
 26. See id. at 1662–65 (arguing that inclusion on a child abuse registry 
forecloses job opportunities, depriving applicable individuals of a liberty 
interest). 
 27. See infra Part II.C. 
 28. See infra Part II.A–C. 
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Because all parents listed on these registries must be given 
due process protections, in Part III of this Article, we apply the 
balancing test laid out in Mathews v. Eldridge29 to abuse and 
neglect registries.30 We lay out the private interest and the risk 
of erroneous deprivation under procedures used by various 
states and discuss the states’ interests and burdens.31 We 
conclude by proposing best practices under the Mathews v. 
Eldridge framework.32  
II. Registries and the Challenge of the “Stigma-Plus” Test 
A. Abuse and Neglect Registries 
All fifty states have registries of people investigated and 
deemed potentially responsible for child abuse or neglect.33 
Federal law requires states to maintain a central hotline where 
the public can make reports of suspected child abuse and 
neglect.34 Federal law also requires child protective agencies to 
conduct an immediate investigation of these reports and to 
promptly determine whether the report is substantiated.35 
Outside of these federal guidelines, states establish their 
own procedures for agency investigations.36 State statutes often 
mandate a brief timeline for investigation. For example, in New 
York, the agency must make a determination in sixty days.37 
There are not always clear requirements for the brief agency 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 29. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 30. See id. at 335 (describing the three distinct factors to be considered in 
analyzing the appropriate due process required). 
 31. See infra Part III.A. 
 32. See infra Part III.B. 
 33. See, e.g., John Sherman, Procedural Fairness for State Abuse 
Registries: The Case for the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard, 14 J. 
GENDER, RACE & JUST. 867, 868 (2011) (“In response to growing awareness of 
child abuse in the United States, every state has adopted procedures for 
maintaining child abuse and neglect records.”). 
 34. 42 U.S.C. § 5106(a) (2018). 
 35. Id. 
 36. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424 (McKinney 2019) (providing an 
example of a state establishing its own procedure for agency investigations). 
 37. See id. § 424(7) (mandating agencies “determine, within sixty days, 
whether the report is ‘indicated’ or ‘unfounded’”). 
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investigation.38 The agency investigation may simply include an 
interview with the child and the suspected parent, or may 
include additional interviews with household members, 
neighbors, or school professionals.39 During these 
investigations, parents do not have the same protections in their 
interactions with child protective agency workers as they would 
with law enforcement in a criminal investigation, such as 
Miranda rights.40  
At the end of the child protective investigation, the agency 
will make a preliminary determination about whether there is 
enough evidence that the allegations occurred to “substantiate” 
the report.41 A few consequences flow from a report being 
“substantiated:” first, the agency may decide that intervention 
into the family is warranted.42 The agency may do so informally, 
offering services or referrals for the family, or the agency may 
bring an action in court seeking a court order placing the family 
under supervision, mandating participation in services, or, 
where the agency deems necessary, removing the child or 
children from the care of the parent(s).43 Because the agency 
may decide against going to court, many substantiated reports 
are never litigated in a court of law.44 Nevertheless, whenever a 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 38. See, e.g., id. § 424 (lacking a description of steps for investigation). 
 39. See, e.g., N.Y.C. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN’S SERVS., A PARENT’S GUIDE TO 
CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES IN NEW YORK CITY, https://perma.cc/5AMD-L6CT 
(PDF) (answering frequently asked questions about Child Protective Service 
in New York City). 
 40. See Donald Dickson, When Law and Ethics Collide: Social Control in 
Child Protective Services, 3 ETHICS & SOC. WELFARE 264, 268–69 (2009) 
(“[M]any of the constitutional protections available in a criminal setting, 
namely the right to a ‘Miranda warning’, the right to counsel, the right to know 
one’s accuser, and protections against self-incrimination, among others, are 
not automatically available to parents or guardians in civil child abuse 
actions.”). 
 41. See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424(6)(a)–(7) (describing the requirements 
of child protective investigations and requiring the resulting report to be 
“indicated” or “unfounded” within sixty days). 
 42. See id. § 424(10)–(13) (outlining possible agency courses of action 
when it deems intervention into the family is warranted). 
 43. See id. (describing potential agency courses of action in detail). 
 44. See Hon. Leonard P. Edwards & Steven Baron, Alternatives to 
Contested Litigation in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 33 FAM. CT. REV. 275, 
275 (1995) (“Child abuse and neglect cases are usually resolved without 
contested hearings by agreement of the parties.”). 
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report is substantiated and regardless of whether the report has 
been the subject of a court case, a second consequence also 
arises: the agencies must place a copy of any substantiated 
report in the child abuse and neglect registry.45 
The standards for being listed on and removed from these 
registries vary substantially from state to state.46 Perhaps the 
most significant differences are the standards for being placed 
on the registries.47 Some states, such as New York, require only 
“some credible evidence” or “probable cause,” as determined by 
a caseworker, to place individuals on the registry.48 About a 
third of states require “substantial evidence” or a 
“preponderance of the evidence.”49 Some states do not list 
individuals on registries until an appeal is unsuccessfully 
exhausted50 or until a court has made a finding against the 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 45. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424(3) (requiring the agency to 
“transmit, forthwith, a copy [of the report] thereof to the state central register 
of child abuse and maltreatment”); 23 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6334(g) 
(2019) (requiring the department to “maintain a record of the complaint of 
suspected child abuse in the Statewide database”). 
 46. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, ESTABLISHMENT, AND 
MAINTENANCE, supra note 17, at 3–26 (providing a consolidation of all states’ 
laws in relation to the establishment and maintenance of central registries for 
child abuse or neglect reports). 
 47. See id. (capturing various state purposes for their respective child 
abuse and neglect registries). 
 48. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424-a(e)(ii)–(v) (McKinney 2019) 
(describing the proper protocols if there is or is not “some credible evidence” of 
abuse or maltreatment); ALA. CODE § 26-14-8(a) (2019) (stating an “indicated” 
report occurs “when credible evidence and professional judgment 
substantiates that an alleged perpetrator is responsible for child abuse or 
neglect”). 
 49. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7b-101,7B-311 (2019) (defining 
substantial evidence as “relevant evidence a reasonable mind would accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion”); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-720 (2019) 
(stating a case will be entered into the central registry if “the subject of the 
report of child abuse or neglect was supported by a preponderance of the 
evidence”). 
 50. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-714(d) (West 2020) (stating an 
individual will only be entered into the central registry if found guilty of a 
criminal abuse or neglect charge or has been found responsible for the abuse 
or neglect and has exhausted his or her appeals or failed to timely file an 
appeal); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 616 (2019) (capturing the requirements for 
an individual to be placed on the central registry). 
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parent or caregiver.51 Other significant differences in state laws 
regarding child abuse and neglect registries include who can 
access the registry and the procedures and standards to be 
removed from the registry.52  
Having one’s name on such registries often prevents 
individuals from being hired by employers in any field involving 
children. In many states, these registries can or must be 
accessed by agencies that provide services to children, 
particularly childcare.53 Pennsylvania explicitly requires 
certain employers to deny an applicant or immediately fire an 
employee if there is a founded report in the registry within five 
years.54 Other states, such as New York, allow employers to hire 
an individual whose name appears in the registry, but require 
the employer to generate a written report in the individual’s 
employment file stating the specific reasons why the person was 
hired despite the indicated report.55  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 51. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-1930 (2019) (requiring a petition for 
placement of a perpetrator on the central registry to have a “written case 
summary stating facts sufficient to establish [the perpetrator’s abuse or 
neglect] by a preponderance of evidence”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-257 ( 2019) 
(“A name is to be added to the registry only based upon a criminal conviction 
or an adjudication by a youth court judge or court of competent jurisdiction, 
ordering that the name of the perpetrator be listed on the central registry.”). 
 52. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, ESTABLISHMENT, AND 
MAINTENANCE, supra note 17, at 2 (“Who has access to information maintained 
in registries and department records also varies among States. In addition, 
the length of time the information is held and the condition for expunction 
vary from State to State.”). 
 53. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8:10a(b)(13) (West 2019) (specifying to 
whom and in what situations records of child abuse reports may be released); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432.100(3)(b) (2019) (same). Only two states, New York 
and Pennsylvania, require employers to check the registry prior to hiring 
employees. See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424-a(3) (requiring specified employers 
to check the registry prior to hiring applicants); 23 PA. STAT. AND CONST. STAT. 
ANN. § 6344(c)(1) (requiring specified employers to deny applicant 
employment if he or she is named in the statewide database). Other states 
simply permit access to the registry. 
 54. See 23 PA. STAT. AND CONST. STAT. ANN. § 6344(c) (requiring specified 
employers to deny applicant employment if he or she “is named in the 
Statewide database as the perpetrator of a founded report committed within 
the five-year period immediately preceding verification”). 
 55. See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424-a(2) (requiring specified employers to 
maintain a record “of the specific reasons why such person was determined to 
be appropriate” for the applicable role in question). 
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Depending on the state statute, child abuse and neglect 
registries often provide access to a variety of employers, as long 
as the services the employer provides involve any significant 
contact with children. Some states maintain a narrow, specific 
list of child-care employers who have access to the registry.56 
However, many states, like New York, permit broad access to 
any employer “who provides goods or services who has the 
potential for regular and substantial contact with children.”57 In 
these states, individuals whose names appear in the registry 
may be precluded from employment in a wide range of 
industries beyond childcare, including education, healthcare, 
and transportation.58 
Employment is not the only aspect of one’s life that can be 
affected by being listed on a child abuse and neglect registry. In 
all states, including the District of Columbia, a person on the 
registry may be disqualified as a kinship foster care or adoptive 
parent.59 Child abuse and neglect registry information often is 
made available to individuals and entities with an interest in a 
specific report, such as reporting physicians, police, judges, and 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 56. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 235A.15(c) (West 2020) (permitting use of 
registry for employment screening only at a psychiatric medical institution for 
children, child foster care facility, licensed child care facility, school 
professionals working with disabled children, state program providing direct 
services to children, hospital, early intervention education services, or nursing 
program). 
 57. See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424-a(1)(b)(i) (outlining inquiries 
employers who provide such services or goods must make prior to hiring an 
applicant). See also, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.627(3) (West 2019) 
(permitting access to any employer if employment or volunteer work “will 
include contact with children”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-205 (3)(o) (2019) 
(permitting access to any employer who “may have unsupervised contact with 
children”). 
 58. See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424-a(1)(b)(i) (McKinney 2019) (requiring 
employers to inquire whether any applicant “who provides goods or services 
who has the potential for regular and substantial contact with children,” an 
inherently broad description, is in the registry). 
 59. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR 
PROSPECTIVE FOSTER, ADOPTIVE AND KINSHIP CAREGIVERS 1 (2016), https://
perma.cc/92MQ-4A8G (PDF) (requiring states, under federal law, to check any 
child abuse and neglect registry maintained by the State for information on 
prospective foster or adoptive parents and any adult residing in the home). 
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court personnel.60 The existence of a report can negatively 
impact a parent in custody determinations.61 It can also prevent 
parents from volunteering in their children’s schools or 
extracurricular programs.62  
When conducting investigations, child welfare personnel 
routinely check a person’s prior reports on the registry and use 
information on the registry about prior investigations to justify 
additional state scrutiny of the parent.63 In many states, child 
protective agencies also are instituting predictive analytics: 
automated prediction tools that use historical data to “score” 
children’s risk of future harm.64 Prior substantiated cases or 
inclusion in registries may act as one of the “inputs” into these 
models, causing families whose names appear on these 
registries to have higher “risk scores.”65 
Federal statutory law requires minimal due process 
procedures for registries for child abuse and neglect.66 The Child 
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) requires that 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 60. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL 
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT RECORDS 2 (2017), https://perma.cc/CB8N-UVAZ 
(PDF) (“In general, individuals and entities are granted access to a case 
because they have a direct interest in the case, direct interest in the child’s 
welfare, or have an interest in providing protective or treatment services.”). 
 61. See infra Part II.C. 
 62. See infra Part II.C. 
 63. For example, child protective personnel use prior reports in the 
registry to decide whether to refer a new report to law enforcement. See, e.g., 
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424-a (requiring child protective personnel to consider 
contacting local law enforcement if there are two prior reports within six 
months). Child protective personnel use prior reports in the registry to make 
assessments about whether a child should be removed from their home. See, 
e.g., N.Y.C. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN’S SERVS., SAFETY AND RISK ASSESSMENT 
RESOURCE GUIDE 8–9 (2013), https://perma.cc/S9S7-BQ52 (PDF) (instructing 
caseworkers to assess whether there has been prior abuse or maltreatment). 
 64. See, e.g., Stephanie K. Glaberson, Coding Over the Cracks: Predictive 
Analytics and Child Protection, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 307, 331–36 (2019) 
(discussing the use of predictive analytic tools in states’ child protective 
efforts). 
 65. See, e.g., RHEMA VAITHIANATHAN ET AL., CENTRE FOR SOCIAL DATA 
ANALYTICS, DEVELOPING PREDICTIVE RISK MODELS TO SUPPORT CHILD 
MALTREATMENT HOTLINE SCREENING DECISIONS: ALLEGHENY COUNTY 
METHODOLOGY AND IMPLEMENTATION 38 (2017), https://perma.cc/JJV4-VRBS 
(PDF) (showing that prior referrals are included as variables in both Allegheny 
county’s “placement” and “re-referral” predictive models). 
 66. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106a (2018) (detailing the provisions and procedures 
that states must implement for prevention of child abuse or neglect). 
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state applications for federal grants include assurances that the 
state has an enforced law that includes procedures for reporting, 
responding to, and maintaining records of alleged child abuse 
and neglect.67 CAPTA also requires a procedure for removing or 
expunging records that are “unsubstantiated or false,” but it 
allows even such false records to be retained by and available to 
child protective agencies.68  
B. Procedural Due Process and the Stigma-Plus Test 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution requires that certain steps must 
be taken before the state can deprive a person of rights accorded 
to them by the state.69 A state cannot deprive a person of a 
liberty or property interest without providing an appropriate 
opportunity for review.70 When a plaintiff claims that a state 
has violated the Due Process Clause, she first must demonstrate 
that she has a liberty or property interest with which the state 
has interfered.71 Only then does a court proceed with an analysis 
of whether the state provided due process.72 When considering 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 67. See id. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)  (requiring numerous assurances for states to 
receive grants for their child protection programs). 
 68. See id. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xii) (requiring state protocols “that facilitate 
the prompt expungement of any records that are accessible to the general 
public or are used for purposes of employment or other background checks in 
cases determined to be unsubstantiated or false,” although state child 
protective services may keep the information on file). Another provision of 
CAPTA requires that the Secretary of Health and Human Services maintain 
a clearinghouse of data and information regarding child abuse and neglect. 
See id. § 5104 (establishing a national clearinghouse “for information relating 
to child abuse and neglect”). That clearinghouse, the Child Welfare 
Information Gateway, provides little to no guidance on state child abuse and 
neglect registries. See generally Child Welfare Info. Gateway, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://perma.cc/M4W8-U9KA (last visited Jan. 4, 
2019) (providing information on child welfare topics) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 69. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (requiring states to afford 
individuals due process before depriving them of a property or liberty interest). 
 70. See id. (requiring an opportunity for review prior to deprivation of a 
property or liberty interest). 
 71. See Humphries v. Cty. of L.A., 554 F.3d 1170, 1184–85 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(stating that the litigant must show “the conduct violated a right secured by 
the Constitution and laws of the United States”). 
 72. See id. (stating that deprivation of a liberty or property interest is a 
threshold a litigant must overcome to have a due process claim). 
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the constitutional sufficiency of the procedures states provide 
for individuals listed in child maltreatment registries, we 
therefore first must consider what liberty or property interests 
are at stake, and how they may be infringed by a person’s 
inclusion in such a registry.73 
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Paul v. 
Davis set out the dominant paradigm courts use to 
conceptualize the rights infringement wrought by registry 
inclusion: the “stigma-plus” test.74 In Paul, the plaintiff brought 
a § 1983 action after police distributed a flyer to local merchants 
purporting to contain information on “active shoplifters,” which 
included the plaintiff’s name and photograph.75 The plaintiff’s 
employer discovered his inclusion in the flyer, and although 
Paul was not fired, he was instructed that “he ‘had best not find 
himself in a similar situation’ in the future.”76 The Court 
determined that “the procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment apply” only when, “as a result of the state action 
complained of, a right or status previously recognized by state 
law was distinctly altered or extinguished.”77 The Court 
conceived of the rights deprivation caused by being listed on a 
registry as a reputational injury.78 Though the Supreme Court 
previously had implied that a person’s liberty interests could be 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 73. Compare Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 479 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(determining “[a] charge that merely makes plaintiff less attractive to other 
employers but leaves open a definite range of opportunity does not constitute 
a liberty deprivation”), with Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1002 (2d Cir. 
1994) (determining a plaintiff’s liberty interests were disrupted by the state 
when placement on a child abuse and neglect registry impacted her private 
employment opportunities). 
 74. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701–13 (1976) (discussing, in detail, 
how harm to an individual’s reputation and arising stigma, alone, is 
insufficient to constitute deprivation of a liberty or property interest). 
 75. See id. at 695 (describing the flyer the police distributed, which 
displayed the plaintiff’s name and photograph and depicted him as a 
shoplifter). 
 76. Id. at 696. 
 77. Id. at 711 (emphasis in original). 
 78. See id. (“But the interest in reputation alone which respondent seeks 
to vindicate in this action in federal court is quite different from the ‘liberty’ 
or ‘property’ recognized . . . .”). 
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implicated when her reputation was at stake,79 in Paul, the 
Court made clear that an individual’s “interest in reputation 
alone [] is quite different from the ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ 
recognized [in the Fourteenth Amendment].”80 For this reason, 
the Paul Court found that an allegation of pure reputational 
injury—without more—does not state a claim under § 1983.81 
This holding has become known as the “stigma-plus” test. 
Following Paul, courts engage in the process of determining if 
the claimed reputational injury—the stigma—is accompanied 
by a denial of a “more tangible” interest—the “plus”—when 
analyzing claims that implicate one’s reputation rather than 
another clear liberty or property interest recognized under state 
law.82  
Child abuse and neglect registries have been the subject of 
due process litigation in several federal courts, though there 
have not been a great number of cases.83 When plaintiffs have 
brought claims that a state actor violated their due process 
rights by placing them on a child abuse and neglect registry, 
federal courts have used the “stigma-plus” test to determine if 
the alleged harm to reputation rises to a level that implicates 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.84  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 79. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (“Where a 
person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what 
the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are 
essential.”). 
 80. Paul, 424 U.S. at 711. 
 81. See id. at 711–12 (finding reputational injury alone to be insufficient 
to state a due process claim). 
 82. See Humphries v. Cty. of L.A., 554 F.3d 1170, 1185 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(citing Paul, 424 U.S. at 711) (“The Supreme Court clarified that procedural 
due process protections apply to reputational harm only when a plaintiff 
suffers stigma from governmental actions plus alteration or extinguishment 
of ‘a right or status previously recognized by state law.’”). 
 83. One commentator has speculated that the lack of cases in this area is 
due to lack of funds for representation on the part of many potential litigants. 
See W. Todd Miller, The Central Registry Statute for Abuse and Neglect 
Matters Is Constitutionally Flawed, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 651, 652 
(2011) (“It has been my experience that many of the litigants are not 
sufficiently funded to retain counsel. For these reasons, these cases do not 
ordinarily find their way to the appellate courts.”). 
 84. See, e.g., Humphries, 554 F.3d at 1185 (citing Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 
1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006)) (applying the “stigma-plus test”). 
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When the plaintiff’s inclusion on the registry has had 
consequences for his or her employment, federal appellate 
courts, including the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, have 
found those plaintiffs to have demonstrated harm to a liberty 
interest and that the Due Process Clause was implicated.85 For 
example, Humphries v. County of Los Angeles86 involved a 
challenge brought to a California registry in which the state law 
and county practice failed to provide any mechanism to allow 
listed individuals to challenge the placement of their name on 
the registry.87 The plaintiffs were parents accused of abuse who 
were determined to be factually innocent by a court, but could 
not cause their names to be removed from the child abuse and 
neglect registry.88 The court found that the plaintiffs’ claims met 
the “stigma-plus” standard because placement on the state 
registry altered their rights due to the impact on employment 
opportunities.89  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 85. See, e.g., Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1002 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding 
that defamation in conjunction with a statutory impediment to employment 
constitutes deprivation of a liberty interest); Dupuy v. Samuels, 397 F.3d 493, 
503 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that findings of abuse or neglect against a child 
care worker which effectively bar that person from future employment in the 
child care field “squarely implicate a protected liberty interest”); Humphries, 
554 F.3d at 1185 (identifying being listed on California’s Child Abuse Central 
Index (CACI) as a deprivation of a liberty interest that implicates due process). 
 86. 554 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 87. See id. at 1182 (describing the Humphries’ discovery that there was 
no available procedure to challenge the CACI listing). 
 88. See id. at 1175 (offering factual history of the Humphries’ case). 
 89. See id. at 1188 (internal citations omitted) 
The Humphries allege more than mere reputational harm—being 
listed on the CACI alters their rights in two general ways. First, 
state statutes mandate that licensing agencies search the CACI and 
conduct an additional investigation prior to granting a number of 
rights and benefits. These rights include gaining approval to care 
for children in a day care center or home, obtaining a license or 
employment in child care, volunteering in a crisis nursery, receiving 
placement or custody of a relative’s child, or qualifying as a resource 
family. These benefits are explicitly conditioned on the agency 
checking the CACI and conducting an additional investigation. 
Second, information in the CACI is specifically made available to 
other identified agencies: state contracted licensing agencies 
overseeing employment positions dealing with children; persons 
making pre-employment investigations for “peace officers, child 
care licensing or employment, adoption, or child placement;” 
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In Valmonte v. Bane,90 the Second Circuit evaluated the 
case of a plaintiff whose employment opportunities were 
impacted by being on the New York State child abuse and 
neglect registry.91 At that time in New York, an individual had 
a right to ask for expungement of the record and a hearing at 
which the state had to “prove to the commissioner the 
allegations against the subject by some credible evidence, and 
then prove that the allegations are reasonably related to 
employment in the child care field.”92 The Second Circuit found, 
as the Ninth Circuit later did in Humphries, that the 
requirement that some employers check the registry met the 
“stigma-plus” standard.93 The court stated, “[i]n other words, by 
operation of law, her potential employers will be informed 
specifically about her inclusion on the Central Register and will 
therefore choose not to hire her. Moreover, if they do wish to hire 
her, those employers are required by law to explain the reasons 
why in writing.”94 The Seventh Circuit came to an almost 
identical conclusion in Dupuy v. Samuels.95 
Not all courts have found potential impacts on employment 
opportunities to be adequate to implicate a liberty interest 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
individuals in the Court Appointed Special Advocate program 
conducting background investigations for potential Court 
Appointed Special Advocates, and out-of-state agencies making 
foster care or adoptive decisions. 
 90. 18 F.3d 992 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 91. Id. at 994. 
 92. Id. at 996 (internal citations omitted). 
 93. See id. at 1001 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)). 
When the Supreme Court stated in Paul v. Davis that injury to 
reputation was not by itself a deprivation of a liberty interest, we 
presume that the Court included the normal repercussions of a poor 
reputation within that characterization. . . . Valmonte is not going 
to be refused employment because of her reputation; she will be 
refused employment simply because her inclusion on the list results 
in an added burden on employers who will therefore be reluctant to 
hire her. 
 94. Id. at 1001 (emphasis in original). 
 95. See Dupuy v. Samuels, 397 F.3d 493, 503 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The district 
court concluded that child care workers effectively are barred from future 
employment in the child care field once an indicated finding of child abuse or 
neglect against them is disclosed to . . . licensing agencies and present or 
prospective employers. Such circumstances squarely implicate a protected 
liberty interest.”). 
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requiring the provision of due process.96 Some courts, including 
Fourth and Eleventh Circuit appellate courts, have dismissed 
claims for lack of a specific, concrete injury to the plaintiff’s 
liberty interests.97 In Hodge v. Jones,98 the Fourth Circuit 
dismissed a claim, specifically noting that the plaintiffs did not 
demonstrate any direct impact on their family life or on their 
employment as a result of their investigation.99 Notably, in 
Hodge, the plaintiffs were not placed on a registry—they sought 
to have the investigative report itself expunged.100 The Eleventh 
Circuit also found in Smith v. Siegelman101 that the 
plaintiff-registrant had not demonstrated that state action had 
implicated a liberty interest sufficient to meet the stigma-plus 
standard,102 going so far as to say that “the deleterious effects 
that flow directly from a sullied reputation, such as the adverse 
impact on job prospects, are normally insufficient [to 
demonstrate a protected liberty interest].”103 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 96. See, e.g., Glasford v. New York Dep’t Soc. Servs., 787 F. Supp. 384, 
388 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that the plaintiff did not allege a harm to his 
employment prospects from being placed on a child abuse and neglect 
registry). The court ruled that he did not demonstrate a harm to his liberty or 
property interests. Id. at 387–89. 
 97. See, e.g., Hodge v. Jones, 31 F.3d 157, 165 (4th Cir. 1994) (identifying 
only a conclusory allegation of a reputational injury and no accompanying 
deprivation of a tangible interest); Smith v. Siegelman 322 F.3d 1290, 1297 
(11th Cir. 2003) (“We agree that Smith’s employment and custody rights in 
the future could be affected adversely due to the information on the Registry, 
but the district court’s conjecture overlooks Paul’s insistence that reputational 
damage alone is insufficient to constitute a protected liberty interest.”). 
 98. 31 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 99. Id. at 164–65. 
 100. See id. at 162 (identifying the basis of the Hodges’ action); see also 
Howard v. Malac, 270 F. Supp. 2d 132, 141–42 (D. Mass. 2003) (noting that 
plaintiffs were placed on a child abuse and neglect registry). The court cited 
Hodge and Glasford to find that the plaintiffs had not met the stigma-plus 
standard because they had not demonstrated an injury beyond that to their 
reputation. Id. 
 101. 322 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 102. See id. at 1297–98 (“The complaint does not at any point allege that 
Smith was denied any right or status other than his not being branded a child 
sexual abuser.”). 
 103. Id. (citing Seigert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991)). 
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C. Parenting as a Right 
As described above, in order for a court to reach the merits 
of a due process claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
state has interfered with a protected interest. That qualifying 
injury must be to a right given by the state, including 
fundamental rights recognized by the Constitution.104 The 
Supreme Court required in Paul v. Davis that a plaintiff must 
demonstrate more than “merely” an injury to his or her 
reputation, and courts have tended to focus on that standard as 
they have evaluated whether a plaintiff demonstrated an injury 
to a protected interest in the context of child abuse and neglect 
registries.105 We contend that since parenting has been 
recognized by the Supreme Court to be a fundamental right that 
states must protect, and child abuse and neglect registries 
significantly alter that right, all parents listed on these 
registries should be entitled to the protections of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Especially as the 
use of historical data to guide agency action multiplies in the 
form of predictive analytics, this argument takes on 
considerable force.106  
Privacy interests, long recognized by the Supreme Court as 
fundamental liberty interests, though not specifically 
enumerated in the Constitution,107 take two forms: “interest in 
avoiding disclosure of personal matters [and] interest in 
independence in making certain kinds of important 
decisions.”108 Here, we focus on the latter—“interest of 
independence in making certain kinds of important 
decisions.”109 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 104. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711–14 (1976) (discussing the 
scope of rights protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 105. See supra Part II.B. 
 106. See Glaberson, supra note 64, at 310 (discussing increased use of 
predictive analytics). 
 107. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486–87 (1965) (Goldberg, 
J., concurring) (identifying a right of privacy that is “older than the Bill of 
Rights”). 
 108. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977). 
 109. Id. 
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In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,110 the Supreme Court 
established the principle that parents have a constitutional 
right to direct the upbringing and education of their children 
absent a compelling state reason to the contrary.111 Later cases 
clarified and elaborated on that principle. In Roberts v. United 
States Jaycees,112 the Court said, “[c]hoices to enter into and 
maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured 
against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such 
relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is 
central to our constitutional scheme.”113 In a substantive due 
process analysis in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,114 the 
Supreme Court made very clear that the liberty rights of a 
family were significant enough to require a state to fully justify 
any infringement on those rights.115 The Court cited Cleveland 
Board of Education v. LaFleur116 to say, “[t]his Court has long 
recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of 
marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”117 The 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 110. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 111. See id. at 534–35 
[W]e think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably 
interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the 
upbringing and education of children under their control. As often 
heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may 
not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to 
some purpose within the competency of the state. The fundamental 
theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose 
excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children 
by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The 
child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him 
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to 
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations. 
 112. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 113. Id. at 617–18. 
 114. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
 115. See id. at 499 (“[W]hen the government intrudes on choices 
concerning family living arrangements, this Court must examine carefully the 
importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which 
they are served by the challenged regulation.”). 
 116. 414 U.S. 632 (1974). 
 117. Moore, 431 U.S. at 499 (quoting LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 639–40). 
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Court specifically noted that the right of extended families’ 
members to reside with each other was significant.118 
The Supreme Court has, in Smith v. Organization of Foster 
Families for Equality & Reform,119 noted that familial liberty 
interests are rooted in “intrinsic human rights,” and are not 
limited in the way that liberty interests derived from state law 
might be limited by state law.120 Evaluating due process rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court cites a long 
history of cases highlighting the importance of the liberty 
interests in marriage and family, including Wisconsin v. 
Yoder121 and Griswold v. Connecticut,122 concluding that 
“natural” family relationships must be accorded greater 
protection than rights derived from contractual relationships 
with the state.123  
There are, of course, limitations on liberty rights in 
parenting and family life. As noted by the First Circuit, “The 
right to family integrity clearly does not include a constitutional 
right to be free from child abuse investigations.”124 Those 
limitations, however, are accompanied by an emphasis on the 
importance of procedural due process. This is illustrated in, for 
example, Santosky v. Kramer,125 in which the Supreme Court 
held that an entity or person petitioning for termination of 
parental rights must prove the case by “clear and convincing” 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 118. See id. at 504 (“The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially 
grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots 
equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition.”). 
 119. 431 U.S. 816 (1977). 
 120. Id. at 845. 
 121. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 122. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 123. Smith, 431 U.S. at 846–47 
It is quite another [matter] to say that one may acquire [a liberty] 
interest in the face of another’s constitutionally recognized liberty 
interest that derives from blood relationship, state-law sanction, 
and basic human right—an interest the foster parent has 
recognized by contract from the outset. Whatever liberty interest 
might otherwise exist in the foster family as an institution, that 
interest must be substantially attenuated where the proposed 
removal from the foster family is to return the child to his natural 
parents. 
 124. Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 125. 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
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evidence, which is a higher standard than the “preponderance 
of the evidence” standard that applies in most civil cases.126 
It is not necessary for the state to completely extinguish a 
right in order for a court to find infringement. For example, in 
Humphries, the plaintiffs did not show they had been completely 
barred from employment—they demonstrated that their 
employment and volunteering would become more difficult 
because of their inclusion on the registry.127 
The harm caused by inclusion in registries, regardless of 
employment consequences, is omnipresent. Parents who are 
placed on child abuse and neglect registries face a significant 
increase in scrutiny from child welfare workers. Placement on a 
child abuse and neglect registry also impacts custody decisions. 
Such placement can also impede parents’ ability to volunteer in 
the activities in which their children participate, as well as 
affect an individual’s ability to act as a foster parent.128  
With the advent of predictive analytics in child welfare, the 
ways in which registry placement might impact a government 
agency’s approach to a parent or family has become more 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 126. See id. at 769 (considering precedent for the applicable burden of 
proof). 
 127. See Humphries v. Cty. of L.A., 554 F.3d 1170, 1186–87 (9th Cir. 2009) 
We recognize that being listed on the CACI may not fully extinguish 
the Humphries’ rights or status. Agencies that obtain information 
from the CACI are responsible for “drawing independent 
conclusions regarding the quality of the evidence 
disclosed.” . . . However, we need not find that an agency will 
necessarily deny the Humphries a license to satisfy the “plus” test. 
Outright denial would mean that a listing on the CACI has 
extinguished the Humphries’ legal right or status. Rather, Paul 
provides that stigma-plus applies when a right or status is “altered 
or extinguished.” 
(internal citations omitted). In other contexts, courts have said that a right 
must be completely extinguished. Compare Latif v. Holder, 969 F. Supp. 2d 
1293 (D. Or. 2013) (finding a liberty interest in the right to fly), with Beydoun 
v. Sessions, 871 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2017) (stating that the liberty interest found 
in Latif v. Holder did not apply when the plaintiff was not completely banned 
from flying). 
 128. The impact of registry placement on individual’s ability to serve as 
foster and kinship care placements is significant and merits its own 
discussion. It is, however, beyond the scope of the argument of this Article. See 
generally Courtney Lewis, Placing Children with Relatives: The Case for a 
Clear Rationale for Separate Foster Care Licensing Standards, Background 
Check Procedures, and Improved Relative Placement Statutes in Alaska, 34 
ALASKA L. REV. 161 (2017). 
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pervasive and more pernicious.129 Once, a child welfare worker 
might have received information showing that the family 
previously had been referred to the agency, or that the parent’s 
name was listed on the statewide registry, and develop an 
opinion of the family as a result. Now that information is being 
fed into statistical, predictive models that spit out purported 
“risk scores” that may severely—yet opaquely—impact the 
course of a family’s interaction with the agency. 
The fact that registry information may be included as an 
input into these tools raises the stakes for ensuring that 
information included in state registries is as accurate, fair, and 
relevant as possible.130 Where reports remain on state registries 
despite inaccuracies, or as a result of mere procedural barriers, 
they infect these tools—and the decisions that agencies make in 
reliance on their results—with further error and unfairness. 
Placement on a child abuse and neglect registry impacts a 
parent’s ability to participate in her children’s lives. Placement 
on a registry can prevent parents from coaching their children’s 
sports teams.131 It can also prevent parents from volunteering 
in their children’s schools.132 In Washington, Heather 
Cantamessa found that her placement on the registry prevented 
her from volunteering in the classroom or on field trips, and 
volunteering was a requirement of the special public-school 
program in which she had enrolled her children.133 A school in 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 129. See Glaberson, supra note 64, at 310 (discussing the risks of human 
error ingrained in predictive analytics). 
 130. See id. (“Unless careful attention is paid to the assumptions, biases 
and realities of our child welfare system at this critical juncture, algorithmic 
decision-making risks perpetuating and magnifying existing problems.”). 
 131. See Email from David Lansner, Partner, Lansner & Kubitschek, to 
author (July 17, 2019, 5:30 PM EST) (describing a client who could not coach 
his daughter’s baseball team because of a report) (on file with author); Email 
from Diane Redleaf, Exec. Dir., Family Def. Ctr., to author (July 18, 2019, 
10:24 AM EST) (reflecting on cases involving parents who served as volunteer 
coaches) (on file with author). 
 132. See Email from Bonnie Saltzman, Law Offices of Bonnie E. Saltzman, 
LLC, to author (July 18, 2019, 7:12 PM EST) (describing an experience with 
one client prohibited from volunteering at his child’s school) (on file with 
author); Telephone Interview with Diane Redleaf, Exec. Dir., Family Def. Ctr. 
(Dec. 14, 2018). 
 133. Email from Heather Cantamessa, Parent Support Social Servs. 
Worker, to author (July 18, 2019, 12:22 AM EST) (on file with author). 
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Illinois banned a parent from entering her child’s school because 
she had been briefly placed on the registry before a successful 
appeal.134 Even when parents have not been officially rejected 
from volunteering, the fear that their placement on the registry 
might be discovered by people they know can be overwhelming 
and prevent them from participating.135 
Placement on the registry can also have significant impacts 
for parents who are in court for custody determinations. An 
attorney in Arizona described opposing parents using the 
registry “as a cudgel in custody battles.”136 Carolyn Kubitschek, 
an attorney in New York, says that clients she represents in 
child custody cases are sometimes surprised to find that they 
are listed in New York’s child abuse and neglect registry.137 
When that happens, the client may be able to contest the finding 
and placement on the registry.138 However, the process of 
clearing one’s name can take six months or more, and the 
custody case will not be stayed while the parent seeks to clear 
his or her name.139 Since a parent who is listed on the registry 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Ambrosia Eberhardt had a similar experience. See Email from Ambrosia 
Eberhardt, Program Manager, Parents for Parents, to author (July 23, 2019, 
7:07 AM EST) (on file with author). The state of Washington explicitly forbids 
people who are listed on the state child abuse and neglect registry from 
volunteering in schools. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.400.303 (2020) (requiring 
a record check through the Washington state patrol criminal identification 
system and the FBI before hire); see also Email from Amelia S. Watson, 
Parents Representation Managing Attorney, Wash. State Office of Pub. Def., 
to Stephanie Glaberson, Staff Attorney, Civil Litig. Clinic, Georgetown Univ. 
School of Law (Mar. 12, 2019, 07:50 PM EST) (discussing Washington’s 
permanent bar from volunteering at a child’s school) (on file with author). 
 134. Telephone Interview with Diane Redleaf, Exec. Dir., Family Def. Ctr. 
(Dec. 14, 2018). 
 135. See Hope Lyzette Newton, Branded, RETHINKING FOSTER CARE (July 
5, 2019), https://perma.cc/9NDM-FWVX (last visited Jan. 10, 2020) (describing 
ways in which the author feared participating in her family’s activities and 
lives because of her inclusion on New York’s State Central Registry, a status 
she later successfully appealed) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 136. Mary Jo Pitzl, DCS Lists People It Says Are a Danger to Kids. Even 
When They’re Not, AZCENTRAL (Apr. 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/6M52-LZF6 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2020) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 137. Telephone Interview with Carolyn A. Kubitschek, Partner, Lansner 
& Kubitschek (Dec. 21, 2018). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
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is at a serious disadvantage in a custody case, placement on the 
registry can have serious long-term impacts on their custody 
and visitation rights.140 Even if the parent eventually succeeds 
in clearing his or her name, the negative custody or visitation 
order may already have been issued.141  
III. Achieving Procedural Due Process 
If a plaintiff convinces a court that she has a protected 
liberty interest that has been significantly altered by the state, 
thus meeting the stigma-plus standard, the court goes on to 
evaluate the due process claim on the merits.142 In the child 
abuse and neglect registry cases that have gotten to this point 
in federal appellate courts, the courts have found several states’ 
procedures constitutionally insufficient.143  In Valmonte v. Bane, 
for example, the Second Circuit found that the “staggering 
figure” of roughly 2,000,000 individuals listed on New York’s 
Central Register, combined with statistics showing that 
approximately seventy-five percent of those who were able to 
challenge their inclusion in the registry were successful, showed 
that there was an “unacceptably high risk of error.”144 The court 
attributed this risk of error to the low standard of proof required 
before a person’s name was listed, stating that “[t]he crux of the 
problem with the procedures is that the ‘some credible evidence’ 
standard results in many individuals being placed on the list 
who do not belong there.”145 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit found 
in Humphries that the risk of erroneous deprivation under 
California’s scheme was “perhaps the most important” factor to 
consider, and that California’s procedures resulted in it being 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (framing the existence of 
a liberty interest as the threshold issue in a due process violation claim). 
 143. See Humphries v. Cty. of L.A., 554 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that California’s maintenance of the CACI violates the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Dupuy v. Samuels, 397 F.3d 493, 
508– 09 (7th Cir. 2005) (ratifying the district court’s proposed remedy, which 
added more steps to the pre- and post-deprivation processes); Valmonte v. 
Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1004 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the procedural protections 
established by New York are unsatisfactory). 
 144. Valmonte, 18 F.3d at 1004. 
 145. Id. 
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“quite likely” that a person would end up “erroneously listed.”146 
As a result, the Court held that the “lack of any meaningful, 
guaranteed procedural safeguards before the initial placement” 
on the registry, “combined with the lack of any effective process 
for removal from” the registry constituted a due process 
violation.147 The respondent states made changes in their 
practices in response to those court decisions,148 but more 
changes are required to ensure that all state processes and 
procedures fully comply with the Due Process Clause.  
In this Part, we will lay out due process standards and 
considerations in the child welfare context. We will then use 
case law and findings from comparing the laws, practices, and 
outcomes in states across the country to suggest best practices 
to maximize due process under Mathews v. Eldridge. 
A. Balancing Act  
1. The Mathews v. Eldridge Standard 
Once a right to a due process analysis has been identified, 
courts evaluate the claim by using the balancing test laid out in 
Mathews v. Eldridge. Under Mathews v. Eldridge, a due process 
analysis requires a court to consider three factors:  
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable 
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including 
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail.149 
2. Weighing Abuse and Neglect Registries’ Processes 
There are high stakes in child welfare actions and listing 
individuals in child abuse and neglect registries is no exception. 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 146. Humphries, 554 F.3d at 1194. 
 147. Id. at 1200. 
 148. See, e.g., A.B. 717, 2011 State Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011) (codified 
at CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11165.12, 11169, 11170 (Deering 2019)) (applying 
provisions of the code only to abuse reports that are substantiated). Prior to 
the bill’s enactment, the standard was any report “not unfounded.” Id. 
 149. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). 
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Jill D. Moore lays out some of these considerations when she 
says:  
When a state chooses to place an individual’s name on a child 
maltreatment central registry, it is taking an action that 
potentially could affect that individual’s family life, his 
employment prospects, or even his reputation in the 
community, if registry information becomes known to the 
public. That same action, however, may further any one of 
three interests that the state may have, including: (1) an 
interest in maintaining data that could help it to identify 
children who are being abused or neglected over an extended 
period of time; (2) an interest in maintaining data about child 
maltreatment in the state generally, for the purposes of 
research, policy-making, or funding decisions; or (3) an 
interest in establishing a database of individuals who, 
because of their history of maltreating children, should not 
be provided opportunities—employment or otherwise—to 
obtain unsupervised access to children.150 
Some courts and scholars have concluded that little needs 
to change,151 but advocates vehemently disagree, and the large 
degree of difference in procedures across state lines speaks to 
the fact that there is no consensus on what procedures would 
best serve due process.152 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 150. Moore, supra note 24, at 2111–12 (internal citations omitted). 
 151. See, e.g., Bohn v. Cty. of Dakota, 772 F.2d 1433, 1438–39 (8th Cir. 
1985) 
[T]he ex post procedures for review are fully adequate to test the 
veracity of the County Department’s finding in that these 
procedures substantially incorporate truth-testing measures long 
approved by our legal system. . . . In addition, we believe that the 
interjection of fuller procedural protections at an earlier state in the 
process would be unduly time-consuming and cumbersome, and 
might well reduce important protections which the state legislature 
designed for otherwise vulnerable children. 
See also Sherman, supra note 33, at 894 (“[U]nder the current decisions, the 
Federal Due Process Clause can only be relied upon to require a 
preponderance of the evidence standard in abuse registry cases . . . .”). 
 152. See generally CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
AND HUM. SERVS., ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF CENTRAL REGISTRIES 
FOR CHILD ABUSE REPORTS: STATE STATUTES (2018), https://perma.cc
/S76Q-PCJ3 (PDF). 
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a. Private Interests 
Placement on a child abuse and neglect registry can have 
significant impacts on individuals. As laid out above, being 
placed on a child abuse and neglect registry can increase the 
intensity of any future interactions with the child welfare 
system, impede involvement in children’s activities and 
schooling, and impact child custody and visitation orders.  
Beyond the implications for parenting, inclusion on child 
abuse and neglect registries can have serious employment 
consequences. Many states make registrants’ names available 
to organizations whose employees may have any potential 
contact with children, even in a limited capacity.153 For example, 
a public records request revealed that the New York Statewide 
Central Registry provides access to over 5,000 employers in a 
wide range of industries beyond traditional childcare, including 
home-health aid agencies and transportation services.154 This 
impacts not just teachers and daycare workers, but also people 
who work in any capacity in large agencies, such as hospitals 
and police departments.155 Employers are extremely reluctant 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 153. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-205 (3)(o) (2019) (permitting access 
to any employer whose employees “may have unsupervised contact with 
children through employment”); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424-a (McKinney 2019) 
(permitting access to organizations with “the potential for regular and 
substantial contact with children”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-506 (West 2019) 
(permitting access to employers “engaged in child-related activities”); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 49-5-185 (West 2019) (permitting access to employers whose 
employees “interact with children or are responsible for providing care for 
children”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 432.100 (2019) (permitting access to 
organizations whose employees “could, in the course of his or her employment, 
have regular and substantial contact with children”); WYO. STAT. ANN. 
§ 14-3-214 (West 2019) (permitting access to organizations whose employees 
“may have unsupervised access to children in course of their employment”). 
 154. See NEW YORK OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, LIST OF 
ENTITIES AUTHORIZED TO SUBMIT CLEARANCES TO OCFS’ STATEWIDE CENTRAL 
REGISTER OF CHILD ABUSE AND MALTREATMENT, OCFS FOIL #18-101 (2018) (on 
file with author). 
 155. See, e.g., ABIGAIL KRAMER, THE NEW SCHOOL CENTER FOR NEW YORK 
CITY AFFAIRS, BANNED FOR 28 YEARS: HOW CHILD WELFARE ACCUSATIONS KEEP 
WOMEN OUT OF THE WORKFORCE 5 (2019), https://perma.cc/82Y4-58M7 (PDF) 
(providing an anecdote from a healthcare worker who was placed on New 
York’s registry); Email from Amelia Watson, Parents Representation 
Managing Attorney, Washington State Office of Public Defense, to author 
(July 23, 2019, 2:17 PM EST) (on file with author) (stating that being listed on 
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to hire individuals who are on the registry, more so, some say, 
than individuals with a minor criminal history.156 In many 
jurisdictions, parents can lose jobs even when a court has 
dismissed their child abuse or neglect case because, in most 
states, the registry is not coordinated with family court 
decisions.157  
The right to greater family association is also impacted by 
inclusion on child abuse and neglect registries.158 Individuals on 
registries are precluded from serving as foster parents and very 
often are not approved to provide kinship care to their own 
family members.159 CAPTA requires that foster care agencies 
conduct a criminal record check and a check of the child abuse 
and neglect registry for all prospective foster and adoptive 
parents.160 Though it does not require a criminal record check 
for all residents of a prospective adoptive household, CAPTA 
does require that all adult residents in a prospective foster or 
kinship home be checked for inclusion in the child abuse or 
neglect registry in order to qualify for federal kinship care 
funding.161  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
the registry in the state of Washington prevents employment in many health 
care fields, among other obstacles). 
 156. See KRAMER, supra note 155, at 4 (noting the recently enacted laws 
which make it illegal for employers to ask about an applicant’s criminal 
history). 
 157. See infra Part III.B.4.c; see also Nikita Stewart, The Child Abuse 
Charge Was Dismissed. But It Can Still Cost You a Job., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 
2019), https://perma.cc/3QRK-25MV (last visited Dec. 27, 2019) (“[M]any state 
databases keep names on the lists even after people are cleared of 
allegations.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 158. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, ESTABLISHMENT, AND 
MAINTENANCE, supra note 17, at 1–4 (listing the bases upon which a state may 
deny a prospective foster parent, adoptive parent, or kinship giver). 
 159. See id. at 3–4 (providing that all states “require checks of the [state’s] 
child abuse and neglect registries” as part of the review process and the 
applicant’s name on a child abuse registry is a basis for disqualification in all 
states). 
 160. See Howard Davidson, The CAPTA Reauthorization Act of 2010: What 
Advocates Should Know, 29 CHILD. L. PRAC. 177, 182 (2011) (explaining the 
CAPTA background check requirements). 
 161. See id. at 182 (noting the background check requirements for the 
applicants and those living in the residence). 
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b. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation 
As will be discussed below, low evidentiary standards, 
imprecise requirements for placement on child abuse and 
neglect registries, limited time frames for challenging hearing 
placement, problems with notice, and challenges for pro se 
parents at hearings create a high risk for erroneous deprivation 
of rights. Currently, a very high number of individuals who seek 
removal of their report from the registry are ultimately 
successful at overturning their report.162 State courts have 
found “a disturbingly high” reversal rate, even as high as 
seventy-five percent.163 Recent data collected from state 
agencies suggests that appellants continue to have an over fifty 
percent reversal rate.164 This high error rate is still woefully 
incomplete because many people face barriers to requesting an 
appeal in the first place. For example, for the estimated 50,000 
people added to the registry in 2017 in New York, the State 
received fewer than 9,300 requests for removal.165 From the 
existing data and the barriers to litigation, it is clear that a high 
risk of erroneous deprivation exists across jurisdictions today.166 
c. State Interests 
As the Supreme Court noted in the context of termination 
of parental rights proceedings in Santosky v. Kramer, “[t]wo 
state interests are at stake” when dealing with state 
interference in parental rights: “[A] parens patriae interest in 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 162. See Lee TT v. Dowling, 664 N.E.2d 1243, 1252 (N.Y. 1996) (stating 
that the margin of error in adding an individual to the registry is 
“unquestionably significant”). 
 163. Id.; see also Jamison v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 218 S.W.3d 399, 409 (Mo. 
2007) (citing to evidence that Missouri’s Child Abuse and Neglect Review 
Board reverses the local agency’s “probable cause determination[s] somewhere 
in the vicinity of 35–40% of the time”). 
 164. NEW YORK OFFICE OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, RESPONSE TO 
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW REQUEST REGARDING OCFS’ STATEWIDE 
CENTRAL REGISTER OF CHILD ABUSE AND MALTREATMENT, OCFS FOIL #18-101 
(2018) (on file with author); GA. DIVISION OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN SERVICES, 
OPEN RECORD REQUEST REGARDING GEORGIA CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES 
INFORMATION SYSTEM (2018) (on file with author). 
 165. KRAMER, supra note 155, at 6. 
 166. See id. at 5–6 (explaining the numerous barriers that individuals face 
in seeking to remove their report from the registry). 
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preserving and promoting the welfare of the child and a fiscal 
and administrative interest in reducing the cost and burden of 
such proceedings.”167 These interests are at times conflicting 
and at times convergent.168 
Similar conditions are present in the state’s adjudication of 
public benefits issues.169 In Goldberg v. Kelly,170 the Supreme 
Court observed that the state has an interest in avoiding 
erroneous denials of public assistance.171 Noting that, “[f]rom its 
founding, the Nation’s basic commitment has been to foster the 
dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders,” the 
Goldberg Court found that ensuring uninterrupted public 
assistance until such time as an adjudication that comports with 
due process can occur serves the state’s interest.172 The Court 
found that the state’s interest in allowing the poor to participate 
meaningfully in community life protects against societal 
malaise, and that this interest, coupled with a strong private 
interest, “clearly outweigh[ed]” the state’s competing fiscal 
concern.173  
Ultimately, state interests are served by ensuring the most 
accurate results in its adjudications of listings on child abuse 
and neglect registries because of the state’s “urgent interest in 
the welfare of the child.”174  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 167. Id. at 766. 
 168. See id. at 766–67 (discussing the interplay between the two interests). 
 169. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264–65 (1970) (summarizing the 
two state interests implicated in public benefits issues: ensuring that welfare 
benefits are conferred to individuals eligible to receive them and the state’s 
interest in “conserving fiscal and administrative resources”). 
 170. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 171. See id. at 264 (“[I]mportant governmental interests are promoted by 
affording recipients a pre-termination evidentiary hearing.”). 
 172. See id. at 264–65 (explaining that due process is essential to the 
government’s interest in “uninterrupted provision [of welfare] to those eligible 
to receive it”). 
 173. See id. at 266 (“[T]he interest of the eligible recipient in uninterrupted 
receipt of public assistance, coupled with the State’s interest that his 
payments not be erroneously terminated, clearly outweighs the State’s 
competing concern to prevent any increase in its fiscal and administrative 
burdens.”). 
 174. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (“Since the 
State has an urgent interest in the welfare of the child, it shares the parent’s 
interest in an accurate and just decision.”). 
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Allowing that reducing the cost and burden of proceedings 
is a state interest, though perhaps not as important as ensuring 
accurate decisions, looking to the laws that states have already 
enacted can provide insight into what practices improve 
accuracy without substantially increasing the burden on the 
state. Our survey of the laws of all fifty states revealed a wide 
variety of practices. The different state laws provide concrete 
examples of different ways that a state can articulate and 
protect its interests, including both parens patriae interests and 
fiscal interests in minimizing unnecessary process. They are 
evidence that rigorous due process protections are possible. 
B. Due Process Best Practices 
Due process protections can and should be clearer and more 
robust across the United States for persons included in child 
abuse or neglect registries. The following is a list of suggested 
procedures, drawn from best practices across all fifty states. For 
each procedural protection, this Article will analyze the 
Mathews v. Eldridge factors. Since the private interest has been 
discussed above, this section will focus on: 1) the risk of 
erroneous deprivation with the procedure currently used and 
the probable value of the additional procedural safeguard, and 
2) the state’s interest, including the administrative and fiscal 
burden.  
To create the following recommendations regarding best 
practices, we compiled laws and regulations from all fifty states 
regarding child abuse and neglect registries. We requested data 
through states’ freedom of information acts from states where 
data might be illuminating, and we spoke with practitioners 
from many states. We offer a starting point from which 
legislators, courts, practitioners and activists can, in their own 
states, make improvements to their states’ registries. This list 
is not exhaustive. We do not, for example, make 
recommendations regarding employer access to registry 
information, as that is outside the scope of this Article. Some 
states have taken great steps toward providing procedural 
protections to parents on the registry.175 Those states should 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 175. See Nicholas E. Kahn, Josh Gupta-Kagan & Mary Eschelbach 
Hansen, The Standard of Proof in the Substantiation of Child Abuse and 
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continue to implement those provisions and look to other states 
to see how their statutes can be refined and improved. 
1. Initial Placement on the Registry 
The first key point in the registry process is the decision to 
place an individual on the registry.176 When a call is made to the 
state’s central hotline, a hotline worker typically forwards the 
report to the local child protective agency for investigation.177 A 
child protective investigator is assigned to the case to both 
collect evidence and serve as the decisionmaker as to whether 
abuse or neglect occurred.178 The child protective investigator 
conducts a brief investigation, which may consist of a single 
interview with the child and the parent, or include additional 
interviews with household members, neighbors or school and 
medical professionals.179 
After gathering evidence, the child protective investigator 
must decide whether to mark the case “substantiated” or “not 
substantiated.”180 Different states use different terms, such as 
“indicated”181 or “founded,”182 but this Article will use 
“substantiated” generally to include those terms. Some states 
have a third category, which allows child protective 
investigators to classify reports as “inconclusive” or 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Neglect, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 333, 341–50 (2017) (summarizing the 
efforts of five states to heighten the standard of proof required to substantiate 
a claim of child abuse). 
 176. See Stewart, supra note 157 (describing the effect of an individual’s 
name on the registry). 
 177. See, e.g., A PARENT’S GUIDE TO CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES IN NEW 
YORK CITY, supra note 39 (explaining that calls are first received at the state 
level and then forwarded to the local agency). 
 178. See, e.g., id. (detailing the investigative process and the investigator’s 
decision-making authority). 
 179. See, e.g., id. (explaining that the investigator will speak with 
members of the household and may also speak with teachers, neighbors, and 
health care providers). 
 180. See, e.g., MONT. ADMIN. R. 37.47.602 (2019) (defining the investigating 
worker’s conclusion that a danger to the child may exist as a “substantiated 
report”). 
 181. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERVS. L. § 424-a (McKinney 2019) (using 
“indicated”); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6303 (2019) (using “indicated”). 
 182. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1505 (2019) (stating that the 
investigation results in a determination of “founded” or “unfounded”). 
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“undetermined” if there is not enough evidence of abuse or 
neglect to make a clear determination.183 Child protection 
investigators must write a brief explanation of the outcome of 
their investigation in the record.184 According to practitioners, 
the explanation of a substantiated case is rarely more than a 
few sentences long.185 
There are two main purposes behind an agency’s 
preliminary decision to substantiate a case of child abuse or 
neglect.186 First, substantiation is generally necessary before 
the agency pursues court intervention, such as a judicial finding 
of abuse or neglect against the parent or placement in foster 
care,187 though the vast majority of child welfare cases are never 
brought to court.188 Second, in most states, child protective 
agencies are required to substantiate a case before providing 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 183. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 4-1301.02 (2020) (“Inconclusive report means a 
report . . . which cannot be proven to be substantiated or unfounded.”); 325 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3 (2019) (“‘An undetermined report’ means any report made 
under this Act in which it was not possible to initiate or complete an 
investigation on the basis of information provided to the Department.”); MONT. 
ADMIN. R. 37.47.602 (2019) (stating that a “substantiated report” is based on a 
preponderance of evidence but a “founded report” is based only on probable 
cause); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.12 (West 2019) (“Inconclusive report means 
a report that is determined by the investigator . . . not to be unfounded, but 
the findings are inconclusive and there is insufficient evidence to determine 
whether child abuse or neglect . . . has occurred.”). 
 184. See E-mail from Janet F. Ginzberg, Senior Staff Attorney, Cmty. 
Legal Servs., to author (Feb. 14, 2019, 11:23 EST) (stating that “[i]nvestigators 
write up investigation summaries in their files” and “put their conclusions on 
a form called a CY-48, which is sent in to the child abuse registry”) (on file 
with author). 
 185. See id. (estimating that the investigators’ written summaries are “an 
average of 2 or 3 sentences”); see also E-mail from Diana Rugh Johnson, Child 
Welfare Law Specialist, Diana Rugh Johnson, PC, to author (Mar. 13, 2019, 
11:54 EST) (noting that the summary “is a very short blurb,” akin to a tweet) 
(on file with author). 
 186. See Kahn et al., supra note 175, at 335 (summarizing the two 
purposes). 
 187. See id. (“Substantiation is generally a prerequisite to pursuing a 
judicial finding of abuse or neglect and an order placing a child in foster care.”). 
 188. See KRAMER, supra note 155, at 2 (explaining that most individuals 
on the New York registry are on it because of neglect and were never notified 
of a court proceeding against them). 
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services to the family.189 However, child protective agencies 
have tools at their disposal to keep children safe without 
substantiating a case against a parent.190 Many agencies now 
employ a differential response model in low- to moderate-risk 
cases, wherein they provide services to families without making 
a substantiation decision.191 Services can include a wide range 
of resources, such as emergency financial assistance for housing 
and food, daycare, and home-based family services.192 Studies 
suggest that agencies following these practices are just as 
successful at keeping children safe and may even be more 
effective in child protection.193  
Child protective workers typically submit a report on their 
investigation to the state child abuse and neglect registry 
shortly after receipt of the initial report or substantiation.194 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 189. See id. at 335 (“In most states, the substantiation of abuse or neglect 
is required before child welfare services can be provided, even if those services 
work toward preserving the family and not removal of a child to foster care.”). 
 190. See Patricia L. Kohl, Melissa Jonson-Reid & Brett Drake, Time to 
Leave Substantiation Behind: Findings from a National Probability Study, 14 
CHILD MALTREATMENT 17, 18 (2009) (explaining that data indicate that more 
children of unsubstantiated claims received services than children of 
substantiated claims). 
 191. See id. (“Some states using an ‘alternative response’ or ‘two-track’ 
system do not even attempt to apply the substantiated/unsubstantiated 
distinction to apparently less serious cases.” (citation omitted)). 
 192. See Christine H. Kim, Putting Reason Back into the Reasonable 
Efforts Requirement in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 
287, 291 (1999) (listing the services that a state agency may offer to abused 
and neglected children and their families). 
 193. See, e.g., JOANNE RUPPEL, YUFAN HUANG & GAIL HAULENBEEK, N.Y. 
STATE OFFICE OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE IN CHILD 
PROTECTION SERVICES IN NEW YORK STATE: REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND 
LEGISLATURE 103 (2011), https://perma.cc/WU9Q-ZPRQ (PDF) (summarizing 
the success of an alternative response to child abuse and neglect cases in the 
state of New York). 
 194. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERVS. LAW § 424 (McKinney 2019) 
Each child protective service shall . . . upon the receipt of each 
written report . . . transmit, forthwith, a copy thereof to the state 
central register of child abuse and maltreatment. In addition, not 
later than seven days after receipt of the initial report, the child 
protective service shall send a preliminary written report of the 
initial investigation, including evaluation and actions taken or 
contemplated, to the state central register.  
GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-182 (West 2019) 
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The state registry is typically maintained by a separate 
department or staff within the child welfare agency.195 Once the 
report is in the registry, the listed individual is at risk of being 
flagged when an employer or other entity submits a clearance 
request to the registry.196  
The following section makes two key recommendations as 
to how states can strengthen due process for parents at this 
critical stage, prior to placing their names on the registry. First, 
states should employ a higher burden of proof in making the 
substantiation determination. Second, states should not place a 
parent’s name on a registry until after he or she has had an 
opportunity to exhaust available appeal procedures. 
a. Raise Burden of Proof for Initial Inclusion in Registry 
In at least seventeen states, a caseworker is permitted to 
place a person on the state registry with only some “credible 
evidence” or “probable cause” of abuse or neglect.197 However, a 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
An abuse investigator who completes the investigation of a child 
abuse report made pursuant to Code Section 19-7-5 or otherwise 
and determinates that it is a substantiated case if the alleged child 
abuser was at least 18 years of age at the time of the commission of 
the act shall notify the division within 30 days following such 
determination. 
 195. See, e.g., Child Protective Services Information System (Child Abuse 
Registry), GA. DIV. OF FAM. & CHILD. SERVS., https://perma.cc/PM3S-6LY4 (last 
visited Jan. 8, 2020) (stating that Georgia’s Division of Family and Children 
Services maintains the registry) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 196. See Kohl et al., supra note 190, at 18 (“29 states and the District of 
Columbia allow or require agencies providing care to children and youth to be 
checked against state databases . . . .”). 
 197. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-8(a)(1) (2019) (stating that a report is 
indicated “[w]hen credible evidence and professional judgment 
substantiates . . . abuse or neglect”); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.290(9) (2019) 
(requiring “reasonable cause”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-804.01(D) (2019) 
(using “probable cause”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-101g (2019) (“[T]he 
commissioner shall determine, based upon a standard of reasonable cause, 
whether a child has been abused or neglected . . . .”); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. 
r. 65C-30.001 (2019) (“‘Finding’ means the investigative determination that 
there is credible evidence to support or refute the alleged child 
maltreatment.”); HAW. CODE R. § 17-1610-2 (2019) (using “reasonable cause”); 
325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3 (2019) (requiring “credible evidence” for a report to be 
indicated); 1982 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 7 (1981), 1981 WL 37084 (interpreting 
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clear majority— over twenty-nine states—require a higher 
burden of proof, such as “substantial evidence” or a 
“preponderance of the evidence.”198 State legislatures in states 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Iowa statute on child abuse report standard to mean “some credible evidence” 
(citing IOWA CODE § 232.71D (2020))); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 615 (2019) 
(requiring only that “there is evidence of child abuse or neglect”); MD. CODE 
ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-701 (West 2020) (stating that an indicated report is a 
“finding that there is credible evidence, which has not been satisfactorily 
refuted”); 110 MASS. CODE REGS. § 4.32 (2019) (requiring a standard of 
“reasonable cause to believe”); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 432B.170 (2019) (requiring 
“credible evidence”); N.M. CODE R. § 8.10.3.17 (West 2019) (requiring “credible 
evidence”); N.Y. SOC. SERVS. L. § 412 (McKinney 2019) (stating that a report is 
“indicated” if an investigator determines that “some credible evidence” exists); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A § 1-2-106 (West 2019) (requiring “probable cause”); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-101 (West 2019) (requiring a “reasonable basis”); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4912 (West 2019) (stating that a substantiated “report 
is based upon accurate and reliable information that would lead a reasonable 
person to believe” that abuse or neglect occurred). 
 198. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-702 (West 2019) (requiring a 
“preponderance of the evidence”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.12 (West 2019) 
(defining a “substantiated report” as a report that “is based upon evidence that 
makes it more likely than not that child abuse or neglect . . . occurred”); 12 
COLO. CODE REGS. § 2509-2:7.111(B) (2020) (stating that a basis for appeal is 
that a founded report is not supported by a “preponderance of credible 
evidence”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 902 (2019) (stating that substantiation 
requires a “finding by a preponderance of the evidence”); D.C. CODE 
§ 4-1301.02 (2020) (“Substantiated report means a report . . . which is 
supported by credible evidence and is not against the weight of the evidence.”); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-180 (West 2019) (stating that a substantiated case is 
based on a preponderance of the evidence); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 16.06.01.560 
(2019) (using the standard of “more likely than not”); IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 31-9-2-123 (West 2020) (defining a substantiated report as one based upon 
the “preponderance of evidence”); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 30-46-10 (2019) (using 
“preponderance of evidence”); 922 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:330 (2019) (requiring a 
“preponderance of evidence”); ME. OFFICE OF CHILD & FAM. SERVS., CHILD AND 
FAMILY SERVICES POLICY § IV.D-1 (using a standard of “preponderance of facts 
and evidence”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.628d (2019) (requiring a finding of 
evidence of abuse or neglect before listing on central registry); MINN. R. 
§ 9560.0220 (2019) (requiring “a preponderance of the evidence”); 18-102 MISS. 
CODE R. § E (LexisNexis 2019) (using a standard of “substantial and material 
evidence”); MO. REV. STAT. § 210.152 (2019) (requiring preponderance of the 
evidence after 2004); MONT. ADMIN. R. 37.47.614 (2019) (explaining that only 
substantiated reports, which are based on a preponderance of evidence, may 
be disclosed through the registry); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-720 (2019) (defining 
an “agency substantiated” report as based on a preponderance of the evidence); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:3, -C:35 (2019) (stating that “‘[f]ounded report’ 
means a report made pursuant to this chapter for which the department finds 
by a preponderance of the evidence” and only founded reports are put on the 
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such as New York have recently reviewed this issue and voted 
to raise the burden of proof to comport with the best practices of 
the majority of states across the country.199 
Low “credible evidence” or “probable cause” standards 
present high risks of erroneous deprivation.200 “Some credible 
evidence” has been interpreted to mean merely any “evidence 
worthy of being believed.”201 Courts and scholars have described 
this standard as requiring nothing more than rumor.202 If a 
caseworker believes that there is any support for the allegation, 
she can mark the allegation as substantiated, even if she 
believes the allegation may not actually be true.203 This low 
standard not only does not require the caseworker to seek out 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
registry); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 3A:10-7.3 (2019) (stating  that “substantiated 
report” is based on preponderance of the evidence); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-320 
(2019) (using “substantial evidence”); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6303 (2019) (stating 
that the basis for an indicated report is a finding of “substantial evidence”); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-930 (2019) (stating that indicated findings must be 
based upon on a preponderance of evidence); S.D. ADMIN. R. 67:14:39:04 (2020) 
(defining a substantiated report as one based upon a “preponderance of the 
evidence”); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. § 0250-07-09-.06 (2018) (stating that 
substantiation requires a “preponderance of the evidence”); 40 TEX. ADMIN. 
CODE § 700.511 (2019) (defining “reason-to-believe” as “based on a 
preponderance of the evidence”); 22 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 40-705-10 (2019) 
(defining “founded” as based on “a preponderance of the evidence”); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 26.44.020 (2020) (defining a “founded report” as a determination 
that “it is more likely than not that child abuse or neglect did occur”); WISC. 
STAT. § 48.981 (2020) (requiring “a preponderance of the evidence”); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 14-3-202 (West 2019) (using “a preponderance of the evidence”). 
 199. See S. 6427A, 2019 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (proposing legislation that 
heightens the burden of proof for adding an individual to the state’s registry); 
see also LAUREN SHAPIRO & SARA L. HILTZIK, N.Y. CITY BAR ASS’N, REPORT ON 
LEGISLATION BY THE COUNCIL ON CHILDREN AND THE CHILDREN AND THE LAW 
COMMITTEE 3 (2019), https://perma.cc/4PSF-UYG9 (PDF) (explaining that the 
proposed legislation would heighten New York’s standard to be more 
consistent with the majority of other states). 
 200. See Kahn et al., supra note 175, at 335 (explaining the link between 
the stringency of the standard and the associated risks). 
 201. See Lee TT v. Dowling, 664 N.E.2d 1243, 1251 (N.Y. 1996) (citing 
state guidance on the meaning of “some credible evidence”). 
 202. See id. (“One commentator has observed that this standard 
safeguards only against bad faith or entirely unfounded reports of child abuse: 
it provides no assurance that reports sounding reasonable are, nevertheless, 
erroneous because the same evidence motivating the report will provide the 
basis for confirming it.” (citation omitted)). 
 203. See id. (stating that the standard “allows a report to be indicated if 
only one out of several believable items of evidence supports it”). 
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evidence favorable to the parent, but also does not require her 
to weigh the available evidence.204 The lack of requirement for 
weighing evidence and justifying decisions encourages 
caseworkers to base their decisions on intuition.205 These 
determinations thus become entry points for bias.206 
Caseworkers make the same errors inherent in all human 
decision-making: when they form a quick intuitive assessment, 
they are “skeptical about information when it conflict[s] with 
their view of [a] family but . . . [are] uncritical when the new 
evidence support[s] their view.”207 They often face institutional 
pressure to be risk averse and substantiate cases even if they 
doubt that neglect or abuse occurred because the agency may 
face negative media attention if they fail to monitor a family.208 
Studies have documented that, in the wake of high-profile child 
fatalities, child protection workers react by going into “panic” 
mode,209 substantiating drastically more cases against parents, 
without evidence that the actual incidence of abuse or neglect 
has risen in the population.210 These “panics” ultimately make 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 204. See id. (“[The standard] imposes no duty on the fact finder to weigh 
conflicting evidence, no matter how substantial . . . .”). 
 205. See id. (“Under the present standard a fact finder in such cases may 
be tempted to rely on an intuitive determination, ignoring any contrary 
evidence.”). 
 206. See Jamison v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 218 S.W.3d 399, 411 (Mo. 2007) 
(“As the probable cause standard does not require a balancing of available 
evidence, it leaves the ultimate assessment ‘open to the subjective values’ of 
the fact finder, thereby magnifying the risk of erroneous fact finding.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 207. See Eileen Munro, Common Errors of Reasoning in Child Protection 
Work, 23 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 745, 751 (1999) (explaining that child 
protection professionals fail to maintain “a critical attitude to all evidence”). 
 208. See, e.g., Yoav Gonen, Child Abuse Reports Surge After High-Profile 
Tragedies, N.Y. POST (July 24, 2018, 2:51 PM), https://perma.cc/Q56C-VPCC 
(last visited Jan. 8, 2020) (describing the intense media pressure that New 
York’s Administration of Children Services faced after the deaths of Zymere 
Perkins and Jaden Jordan in late 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 209. See Glaberson, supra note 64, at 322 (explaining that “foster care 
panic” is “the tendency of child welfare systems to engage in a frenzied push 
toward removal of children from their homes following the highly publicized 
death of a child”). 
 210. See Katie Hanna, N.Y.C. INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE, UNDER PRESSURE: 
HOW THE CITY’S CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM RESPONDED TO RECENT HIGH-PROFILE 
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children less safe by overburdening systems and resulting in 
more children experiencing the traumas associated with 
removal and state intervention.211 Finally, the 
overrepresentation of people of color in the child welfare system 
suggests that caseworker determinations may be influenced by 
implicit and explicit racial bias.212 Studies suggest that black 
and Native American children are twice as likely to have their 
parents subjected to child welfare investigations, but also twice 
as likely to have that investigation substantiated against their 
parent.213 Under the low “credible evidence” standard, these 
faulty decision-making processes are encouraged and no 
safeguards exist to cut against the current.214 In fact, courts in 
multiple states have acknowledged that this low standard is 
largely responsible for a “disturbingly high number of false 
positive findings of abuse.”215  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
TRAGEDIES 1 (2018), https://perma.cc/9W4A-CC55 (PDF) (determining that 
“the number of reports of abuse that were substantiated rose by 20 percent in 
fiscal year 2017” after two high-profile child fatalities occurred). 
 211. See Glaberson, supra note 64, at 323–24 (summarizing the 
detrimental effects of the child protection agency’s “panic”). 
 212. See ROBERT B. HILL, CASEY-CSSP ALLIANCE FOR RACIAL EQUITY IN 
CHILD WELFARE, AN ANALYSIS OF RACIAL/ETHNIC DISPROPORTIONALITY AND 
DISPARITY AT THE NATIONAL, STATE, AND COUNTY LEVELS 1–2 (2007), https://
perma.cc/652W-BGB4 (PDF) (explaining that overrepresentation of minorities 
in the child welfare system occurs at each phase of decision-making in the 
process). While scholars debate what accounts for the racial disproportionality 
in the child welfare system, there is evidence that racial disproportionality 
worsens as families move through the child welfare system based on a variety 
of determinations made by caseworkers. See id. (identifying three phases of 
decision-making—investigation, substantiation, and placement into foster 
care—and finding minority overrepresentation at each phase). 
 213. See id. at 10–11 (“[B]lacks and American Indians are about twice as 
likely to be investigated or substantiated than whites . . . .”). 
 214. See Lee TT v. Dowling, 664 N.E.2d 1243, 1251 (N.Y. 1996) 
(summarizing the risks inherent to a low standard). 
 215. See id. at 1252 (citing evidence that seventy-five percent of challenged 
reports were reversed after administrative hearings); see also Jamison v. Dep’t 
of Soc. Servs., 218 S.W.3d 399, 409 (Mo. 2007) (citing evidence that Missouri’s 
Child Abuse and Neglect Review Board reverses the local agency’s “probable 
cause determination[s] somewhere in the vicinity of 35–40% of the time”). 
These courts reconciled the due process concerns by allowing the “some 
credible evidence” standard at the initial stage and then requiring a higher 
standard of proof at the administrative hearing before the report is released 
to employers. Given that this Article argues for a broader appreciation of the 
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For all these reasons, states should require a higher burden 
of proof for placing an individual on the registry. A higher 
standard, such as preponderance of the evidence, and 
regulations requiring investigating caseworkers to gather 
available evidence that does not just support the initial 
assessment but also any evidence that may conflict with that 
assessment, and then to weigh the conflicting evidence, would 
greatly improve the accuracy of substantiation. A recent study 
found that requiring a high standard of proof for substantiation 
of child abuse and neglect does, in fact, influence the disposition 
of reports.216 This study focused on five states: the District of 
Columbia, California, Idaho, Missouri and Wyoming, examining 
the effects after each of these states increased the burdens of 
proof from credible evidence to a preponderance of the 
evidence.217 In some states, the study found that the higher 
standard reduced the likelihood of substantiation by five 
percent.218 Across states that employ a variation of standards, a 
heightened standard of proof is associated with a fourteen 
percent decrease in the likelihood of substantiation.219 States 
that raise their burden of proof can and have trained 
investigators on how to thoroughly collect evidence, document 
observations without using conclusory language, and balance 
the weight of the evidence.220  
Under Mathews v. Eldridge, the high risk of erroneous 
deprivation presented by the low “some credible evidence” 
standard must be weighed against the state’s interest in 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
private interest beyond employment interests, we argue that a higher burden 
of proof should be established at the initial stage as well. 
 216. See Kahn et al., supra note 175, at 333 (“[A] high standard is 
associated with lower rates of substantiation.”). 
 217. See id. at 346–50 (summarizing each state’s policy change and the 
effect of that change). 
 218. See id. at 334 (“[A]n increase in the standard of proof decreases the 
odds of substantiation by 1–5%.”). 
 219. See id. at 343 (“[A]n increase in the standard of proof is associated 
with a decrease in the odds of substantiation of 14%.” (citation omitted)). 
 220. See Joan Owhe, Note, Indicated Reports of Child Abuse or 
Maltreatment: When Suspects Become Victims, 51 FAM. CT. REV. 316, 323 
(2013) (explaining the techniques that investigators would need to employ to 
meet a heightened standard); see also Kahn et al., supra note 175, at 350 
(noting that the Missouri Department of Social Services held a mandatory 
training on how to carefully employ the standard of proof after the legislative 
reform). 
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maintaining such a low threshold.221 When assessed in light of 
the many states that employ a higher standard—with no 
concomitant reduction in their ability to ensure children’s 
safety—the state’s interest is revealed to be less weighty than 
traditionally thought.222 There are currently no studies that 
suggest that states with a higher burden of proof face increased 
rates of child abuse and neglect nor any increase in child 
fatalities due to an agency’s failure to substantiate a case 
against a parent.223 According to the recent study discussed 
above, an increase in the standard of proof is not associated with 
an increase in child fatalities in the state.224 
b. Do Not Place Name in Registry Until Right to a Hearing Has 
Been Exercised and Exhausted 
Most states place a person’s name on their registry 
immediately after the report is substantiated by a brief agency 
investigation.225 Under this system, the onus is then on the 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 221. See Lee TT v. Dowling, 664 N.E.2d 1243, 1251 (N.Y. 1996) (explaining 
that the state’s interest in keeping a low standard is to retain its ability to 
“respond quickly to isolate children from potentially dangerous contact with 
adults on the first indication of possible maltreatment and forewarn providers 
and licensing agencies of possible future harm”). In this case, the court 
brushed by the analysis by simply referring to the state’s parens patriae 
interest generally, with no further explanation. See id. (“[T]he State has a 
strong interest in preserving and promoting [children’s] health and welfare 
and protecting them from abuse.” (citation omitted)). 
 222. See, e.g., Jamison v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 218 S.W.3d 399, 410 (Mo. 
2007) (explaining that while protecting children from abuse and neglect is a 
significant interest, inclusion in the registry is a “complement to the additional 
and more immediate protective measures” already permitted by state law). 
 223. See Kohl et al., supra note 190, at 19 (“To our knowledge, there is no 
existing evidence that substantiation is a general and powerful predictor or 
rereport or recidivism or any other meaningful subsequent events.”). 
 224. See Kahn et al., supra note 175, at 358 (“[A]n increase in the standard 
of proof is not associated with an increase in fatalities in total.”). 
 225. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERVS. LAW § 424 (McKinney 2019) 
Each child protective service shall . . . upon the receipt of each 
written report . . . transmit, forthwith, a copy thereof to the state 
central register of child abuse and maltreatment. In addition, not 
later than seven days after receipt of the initial report, the child 
protective service shall send a preliminary written report of the 
initial investigation, including evaluation and actions taken or 
contemplated, to the state central register. 
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individual to challenge their registry status, even as the report 
remains on file and the consequences are ever-present.226 Even 
when an individual immediately files a request for a hearing, 
the administrative appeal process can take months or over a 
year.227 By the time the individual reaches their administrative 
hearing, they may have already experienced substantial 
deprivations: they may have lost their employment, had a 
finding entered against them in a custody case, or been 
prevented from volunteering at their child’s school. 
Some state courts have found that placing an individual on 
the registry prior to a hearing violates due process under their 
state constitutions.228 Those courts observed that the risk of 
erroneous deprivation was high because parents are not always 
afforded an opportunity to respond to allegations during the 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-182 (West 2019) 
An abuse investigator who completes the investigation of a child 
abuse report made pursuant to Code Section 19-7-5 or otherwise 
and determinates that it is a substantiated case if the alleged child 
abuser was at least 18 years of age at the time of the commission of 
the act shall notify the division within 30 days following such 
determination. 
 226. See Stewart, supra note 157 (“[I]n New York, it is especially easy to 
get on the database and arduous to be removed, amounting to a blacklist for 
many jobs . . . .”). 
 227. When a parent challenges their status on the registry, the agencies 
first do an administrative review before proceeding to a hearing. See, e.g., ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-811(E) (2019) (“If a request for a hearing is made . . . the 
department shall conduct a review before the hearing.”). The case is then often 
set for a pre-trial conference and awaits a hearing date. See, e.g., id. 
(explaining that if the agency “does not amend the information or finding in 
the report . . . within sixty days after it receives [a] request for a hearing,” the 
individual has a right to a hearing). Many states require administrative 
hearings to be stayed until related family court cases are concluded, thereby 
extending the time that the person is on the registry even further. See, e.g., id. 
§ 8-811(F)(1) (providing that an individual does not have a right to a hearing 
if that individual is a party in a pending proceeding “in which the allegations 
of abuse or neglect are at issue”). For parents who have pending cases in family 
court, they are incentivized to speed up their cases by accepting settlements 
so they can challenge their registry status immediately. See, e.g., id. (stating 
that a pending proceeding related to the matter prevents an individual from 
seeking a hearing). 
 228. See In re W.B.M., 690 S.E.2d 41, 52 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (stating that 
North Carolina’s registry procedures “violate[d] an individual’s due process 
rights by listing the individual on the [registry] prior to a hearing”); Jamison, 
218 S.W.3d at 417 (concluding that the inclusion of individuals on the registry 
prior to a hearing violates the due process rights of those individuals). 
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brief agency investigation, and “[n]o matter how elaborate, an 
investigation does not replace a hearing.”229 The courts further 
found that the state’s interest in immediately placing an 
individual on the registry does not outweigh the private interest 
because the registry is a “complement to the additional and 
more immediate protective measures” permitted by law, such as 
removing children from dangerous environments or pursuing 
criminal charges against an alleged perpetrator.230 
States should not place a person’s name on the registry 
until an individual has an opportunity to exhaust his or her 
right to a hearing and appeal. Some states have attempted to 
resolve this “justice delayed is justice denied” problem, with 
varying success. Some simply provide expedited hearings when 
a person is facing “imminent collateral consequences.”231 But 
some, such as Louisiana and Maryland, do not place a person’s 
name on the registry until the deadline to appeal expires or the 
individual loses their administrative hearing.232 Some states 
have taken even more protective measures, such as South 
Carolina and Mississippi, which do not place anyone on the 
registry unless and until the child protective agency petitions 
family court and the family court orders the placement of a 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 229. See In re W.B.M., 690 S.E.2d at 50 (“Although the accused individual 
may have the opportunity to respond to the investigator’s inquiries, this 
opportunity is not guaranteed and there is no requirement that, at the time of 
the interview, the individual be apprised of the allegations against him.”); 
Jamison, 218 S.W.3d at 408–09 (stating the investigative process does “not 
constitute an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time or in a ‘meaningful 
manner’” (citations omitted)). 
 230. Id. at 51. 
 231. See, e.g., 10-148-201 ME. CODE R. § XI (LexisNexis 2019) (“[T]he Chief 
Administrative Hearing Officer shall give priority to any case in which the 
record . . . shows that the appellant has or is likely to suffer imminent 
collateral consequences as a result of the substantiation decision.”); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 49-5-183(d) (West 2019) (“A motion for an expedited hearing may be 
filed in accordance with rules and regulations promulgated by the Office of 
State Administrative Hearings.”). 
 232. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-706.1 (West 2020) (noting that the 
individual’s name will not be placed on the registry unless “the individual has 
been found responsible for indicated abuse or neglect”); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. 
art. 616 (2019) (noting that the individual’s name is not placed on the registry 
until the “individual’s administrative appeals are exhausted”). 
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person on the registry.233 Finally, some states such as North 
Carolina have created two separate registries, the “Central 
Registry” and the Responsible Individuals List (RIL).234 A 
substantiated finding can be immediately placed on the 
“Central Registry,” an internal database that is only accessed 
by child protection workers for the purposes of tracking 
complaints against a family.235 Only the RIL is accessible by 
employers and courts in custody matters.236 Names are not 
placed on the RIL until a person fails to file an appeal in a timely 
manner or loses their appeal.237 
The value of a pre-deprivation hearing is high because it 
allows a hearing to be granted at a time when the deprivation 
can still be prevented.238 However, the value of requiring a 
pre-deprivation hearing depends on whether the state 
effectively requires actual notice and has reasonable deadline 
provisions. For example, if the state has an unusually short 
deadline for requesting a hearing, such as ten days, and allows 
a finding to be entered absent a request for a hearing, allowing 
a pre-deprivation hearing will not provide a meaningful 
protection for parents.239 As discussed below, this Article 
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 233. S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-1930 (2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-257 
(2019). For example, in South Carolina, the Department must petition Family 
Court with a written case summary and argue to the court that 1) abuse and 
neglect is established by a preponderance of evidence and 2) the nature and 
circumstances of the act indicate the person would present a “significant risk 
of committing physical or sexual abuse or willful or reckless neglect if placed 
in position or setting outside of the person’s home that involves the care of or 
substantial contact with children.” S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-1930. The 
Department has discretion to decide which cases it chooses to petition for 
placement on the registry and is only required to file a petition for cases of 
sexual abuse. Id. 
 234. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-311(b) (2019). 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. See Lee TT v. Dowling, 664 N.E.2d 1243, 1252 (N.Y. 1996) (noting 
that pre-deprivation hearings reduce procedural unfairness in this context 
because “[t]he damage to the subject following publication of an 
unsubstantiated report of child abuse may be irreversible”). 
 239. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-183(c) (West 2019) (allowing an 
individual ten days to request a hearing); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(5p) (West 
2019) (same). 
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recommends that states adopt a longer time frame to allow 
people to request hearings, such as 180 days.240 
2. Notice 
Notice, the legal warning that is delivered to a party whose 
rights are affected by a private or state action, is an essential 
element of due process because the right to be heard has “little 
reality or worth unless one is informed that a matter is pending 
and can choose for himself or herself whether to appear or 
default, acquiesce, or contest.”241 The Due Process Clause does 
not prescribe the particular form or contents of notice.242 
However, at a minimum, the notice must provide individuals a 
reasonable time to respond.243 The contents of notice must fairly 
describe how the party can effectuate their rights and the 
consequences of his or her failure to act.244  
Currently, all states have some procedure to notify 
individuals when they are placed on the child abuse and neglect 
registry.245 Current practice does not, however, adequately 
protect individuals’ rights. First, current practice does not take 
into account that the vast majority of individuals facing child 
welfare investigations are living in poverty.246 Scholars have 
argued that in similar administrative hearings, such as 
hearings to terminate public assistance, the daily challenges of 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 240. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.627 (West 2019) (allowing 180 
days from the date of service of notice to request a hearing). 
 241. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 983 (2020). 
 242. Id. § 983. 
 243. Id. § 986. 
 244. Id. § 987. 
 245. See Office of the Assistant Sec’y for Planning and Evaluation, Interim 
Report to the Congress on the Feasibility of a National Child Abuse Registry, 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (May 15, 2009), https://perma.cc
/8G8J-ZNED (last visited Jan. 8, 2020) (detailing the due process and 
notification characteristics of state central child abuse registries) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 246. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil Rights, 2003 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 171, 174 (2003) (“Poverty is key to explaining why almost any child 
gets in the system.”). 
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poverty prevent self-represented litigants from pursuing 
meritorious claims.247 
Second, despite the critical role of notice in due process, 
most states have not created clear statutory rules for notifying 
individuals of their placement on the child abuse and neglect 
registry.248 Without clear rules in the statute, these states leave 
the form and contents of the notice to the agency’s discretion. 
Following the best practices of their peers, states can adopt a 
number of small, practical innovations that ensure individuals 
receive, understand, and have the opportunity to respond to 
these notices.  
a. Send Notice via Certified Mail 
Currently, there is no uniformity among states in how they 
effectuate notice.249 At least four states, including Georgia and 
North Carolina, require the agency to send notice letters by 
certified mail.250 Most states simply require the agency to send 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 247. See Lisa Brodoff, Lifting Burdens: Proof, Social Justice, and Public 
Assistance Administrative Hearings, 23 N.Y.U REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 131, 134 
(2007) (proposing that “the public benefits hearing process is in fact 
fundamentally unfair to low-income appellants and that these appellants are 
almost always at a significant disadvantage in the hearing process”); see also 
Stephen Loffredo & Don Friedman, Gideon Meets Goldberg: The Case for a 
Qualified Right to Counsel in Welfare Hearings, 25 TOURO L. REV. 273, 278 
(2009) (addressing “whether unrepresented welfare claimants actually receive 
the ‘due process of law’ promised by Goldberg, or whether the absence of 
counsel . . . denies vulnerable families any meaningful opportunity to be 
heard”). 
 248. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.19 (West 2020) (“[T]he department 
shall provide notice to a person named in the report as having abused a child 
of the right to a contested case hearing . . . .”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4916 
(West 2019) (“[A] person alleged to have abused or neglected a child and whose 
name has been placed on the Registry . . . shall be notified of the Registry 
entry, provided with the Commissioner’s findings, and advised of the right to 
seek an administrative review . . . .”). 
 249. Compare WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.100(3) (2020) (requiring 
notification by certified mail, and if returned, notification attempted through 
personal service), with 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.12 (West 2019) (requiring 
written notification to be sent to the alleged perpetrator by both regular and 
certified mail). 
 250. See GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-183(a)(2) (West 2019) (requiring notice to 
be sent by certified mail with return receipt requested); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 7B-320 (2019) (“[T]he director shall send the notice to the individual by 
registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, and addressed to the 
individual at the individual’s last known address.”). 
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notice letters by regular mail to the person’s last known 
address.251 Under the current form of notice in most states, the 
risk of erroneous deprivation is high. 
Careful attention to the methods for effectuating notice is 
vital, because families who are subject to substantiation are 
disproportionately poor and homeless, meaning that they are 
less likely to receive mail. Homeless families are more likely 
than low-income families who are housed to be the focus of a 
child protective services investigation.252 In fact, many parents 
may be placed on the registry precisely because they are 
struggling to provide stable shelter for their children.253 Even if 
parents on the registry are not homeless, families living in 
poverty often lack access to stable housing and move 
frequently.254 
States should require notice to be sent by certified mail. 
Certified mail “provides the sender with a mailing receipt and 
electronic verification that an article was delivered or that a 
delivery attempt was made.”255 Without the use of certified mail, 
the notice letter may be sent to an outdated mailing address and 
the agency has no indication that delivery was unsuccessful and 
no reason to attempt more rigorous methods of providing 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 251. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 434.5 (2019) (“All 
hearings held pursuant to this Part will be scheduled by means of a written 
notice issued to the appellant and his or her representative, if known, by the 
department.”). 
 252. See AMY DWORSKY, FAMILIES AT THE NEXUS OF HOUSING AND CHILD 
WELFARE 1 (2014), https://perma.cc/Q72U-NY4F (PDF) (“[H]omeless families 
are more likely than their non-homeless counterparts to be the focus of a child 
protective services (CPS) investigation . . . .”). 
 253. Many parents are investigated for child neglect if they are homeless 
and struggling to supply their children with adequate shelter. For example, 
one case study found that the shelter intake centers in Washington D.C. often 
call the CPS Hotline after parents submit applications. Marta 
Beresin, Reporting Homeless Parents for Child Neglect: A Case Study from Our 
Nation’s Capital, 18 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 14, 26 (2015). 
 254. In one study of families living below the poverty line, the longest 
residence for twenty-eight percent of families ranged from one to three years 
and forty-two percent for five or more years. Cathryne L. Schmitz et al., 
Homelessness as One Component of Housing Instability and Its Impact on the 
Development of Children in Poverty, 4 J. OF SOC. DISTRESS & THE HOMELESS 
301, 309 (1995). 
 255. USPS, What is Certified Mail?, USPS.COM (Nov. 9, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/35VB-UHX8 (last visited Jan. 24, 2020) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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notice.256 The probable value of using certified mail is high 
because it alerts agencies to the fact that notice was not 
accomplished and provides an opportunity to attempt a different 
address.257 Using certified mail presents a minimal expense to 
the agency or state, and the burden of that expense is far 
outweighed by the value of more effectively effectuating actual 
notice to parents.258  
b. Include Registry Consequences in Notice 
States provide varying types and levels of information to 
individuals in their notices. Most state statutes do not require 
the agencies to provide any specific information about the 
consequences of having their name listed in the state’s 
registry.259 But at least one state—Washington—explicitly 
requires by statute that a list of consequences of inclusion be 
provided in the notice letter.260 As a result, the notice letters 
sent in Washington inform parents that their registry status 
may affect their employment and may be considered in a later 
investigation of child abuse or neglect.261 Washington’s scheme 
is a start, but it does not fully protect individuals’ rights. As 
discussed in this Article, a number of important consequences 
may flow from registry inclusion, including effects on parents’ 
custody and visitation rights and their ability to perform the 
daily tasks of parenting, such as volunteering at their children’s 
schools.262  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. See Certified Mail Labels, New USPS Certified Mail Costs, 
CERTFIEDMAILLABELS.COM, https://perma.cc/FYH6-HL7J (last visited Jan. 8, 
2020) (detailing the updated 2020 USPS certified mail service cost) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 259. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 422 (McKinney 2019) (showing that 
New York does not require state agencies to inform individuals of the potential 
consequences of having their name on the registry). 
 260. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.125 (2020) (providing that the notice 
letter must explain, among other things, that the department may use the 
founded report in determining if the individual is qualified to be employed in 
a position having unsupervised access to children or vulnerable adults). 
 261. Id. 
 262. See supra Part II.A. 
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Providing notice of the actual consequences of inclusion in 
a child abuse and neglect registry is vital to ensuring due 
process. Without listing these consequences on notice letters, 
most states place individuals at a high risk of erroneous 
deprivation.263 If individuals do not understand the extent of the 
consequences of being on the registry, they may not understand 
the value of contesting their status relative to the time and 
burden of pursuing an administrative appeal.264 Individuals 
often have a short time frame in which to make this cost-benefit 
analysis.265 The probable value of a clear explanation is high 
because it ensures that individuals fully comprehend the 
potential consequences to their employment and their parental 
autonomy. The state’s interest does not outweigh the private 
interest because there is no cost to adding additional 
information to notice letters. 
To provide adequate notice, due process requires that notice 
letters inform parents of these consequences. In terms of 
employment, the notice letter should provide more specific 
information about the wide range of employers that have access 
to the registry. In terms of parental autonomy, the notice letter 
should, at a minimum, include the following consequences: a 
report on the registry may be considered (1) in a later 
investigation or family court proceeding related to a different 
allegation of child abuse or neglect; (2) in a future custody 
proceeding; (3) if a person wishes to adopt or serve as a kinship 
foster home for relatives; and (4) by schools and youth 
organizations, impeding volunteering in children’s activities. 
c. Include Notice of Available Legal Services Providers 
Generally, individuals contesting their inclusion in a 
registry have the right to have an attorney present but do not 
have the right to free legal representation at cost to the state.266 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. As described further below, most states have a short deadline for 
filing a request to challenge a registry report, sometimes as short as ten days. 
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-7.1 (2019) (ten days); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-183 
(West 2019) (ten days). 
 266.  CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND 
HUM. SERVS., REVIEW AND EXPUNCTION OF CENTRAL REGISTRIES AND REPORTING 
RECORDS (2018), https://perma.cc/34DR-2N4M (PDF). 
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Most states simply require that their notice letters inform the 
individual that they have the right to an attorney, if the statute 
speaks to this at all.267 At least one state—Arkansas—goes 
further, requiring its notice letter to provide the name of a free 
local legal services organization, the Center for Arkansas Legal 
Services.268  
According to practitioners across the country, the vast 
majority of petitioners challenging registry inclusion are 
currently representing themselves (pro se) in their hearings.269 
In contrast, the child protective agencies are always represented 
by counsel.270 Agency counsel have clear advantages over pro se 
litigants, including familiarity with agency records, which can 
include acronyms and jargon, and knowledge of how to present 
evidence and cross-examine witnesses.271 Studies suggest that 
pro se litigants across a range of administrative hearings have 
far less favorable outcomes than represented parties.272 Pro se 
litigants in child abuse and registry hearings face an even 
greater uphill battle. First, the registry hearings do not only 
involve factual allegations, but also include interpreting the 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 267. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-706 (West 2019) (“Notification to an 
alleged offender . . . shall include . . . [a] statement that the person has a right 
to have an attorney . . . .”). 
 268. Id. § 12-18-706. An appellate court in New Jersey recently went much 
further, holding that “indigent litigants are entitled to the appointment of 
counsel when faced with a Division declaration that its investigation has 
substantiated that litigant for child abuse or neglect.” N.J. Dep’t of Children 
& Families v. L.O., 213 A.3d 187, 198 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019). 
 269. Telephone Interview with Brenda Wahler, Law Office of Brenda 
Wahler (Mar. 22, 2019); E-mail from Michael Agranoff, Law Office of Michael 
Agranoff (Mar. 13, 2019, 3:21 PM EST) (on file with author); E-mail from 
Diana Rugh Johnson, Law Office of Diana Rugh Johnson, PC, (Mar. 13, 2019, 
11:54 AM EST) (on file with author); see also Kramer, supra note 155, at 3. 
 270. Telephone Interview with Brenda Wahler, Law Office of Brenda 
Wahler (Mar. 22, 2019); E-mail from Michael Agranoff, Law Office of Michael 
Agranoff (Mar. 13, 2019, 3:21 PM EST) (on file with author). 
 271. See Loffredo & Friedman, supra note 247, at 318 (“The playing field 
in pro se hearings slants far from level because the local agency is represented 
by trained advocates who have enormous tactical advantages over the 
claimant . . . .”). 
 272. See Jessica K. Steinberg, In Pursuit of Justice? Case Outcomes and 
the Delivery of Unbundled Legal Services, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 
453, 460 (2011) (“[R]epresented litigants are anywhere from two to ten times 
more likely to procure the relief they seek when they enjoy the benefit of full 
representation by counsel.”). 
INADEQUATE PROTECTION  909 
 
legal definitions of “abuse” and “neglect.”273 These statutory 
definitions are often vague and the subject of extensive 
decisional interpretation.274 Crafting well-supported arguments 
therefore may require legal research tools that are not 
accessible to pro se litigants.  
Being represented by an attorney is also important because 
preparing a parent to testify may be the most consequential act 
of the hearing process. According to practitioners, the parent is 
expected to testify in the hearing on their own behalf and will 
be subject to cross-examination by agency counsel.275 A trained 
advocate can help a parent to clearly and faithfully present his 
or her story in a way that an individual acting alone may not be 
able to do.276 The hearing officer’s determination often turns 
heavily, if not fully, on the parent’s testimony. The parent may 
be required to testify about deeply intimate or sensitive topics, 
such as their struggle with an addiction or mental illness.277 
Many parents may be living in poverty, lack formal education, 
and/or come from marginalized communities or groups.278 Once 
they have put forward their testimony, they will be subject to 
cross-examination by the agency’s counsel. The administrative 
law judge (ALJ)’s assessment of the parent’s testimony, the 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 273. See generally N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012 (McKinney 2019). 
 274. For example, the term “neglected child” in New York is vaguely 
defined as a child “whose physical, mental, or emotional condition has been 
impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the 
failure of his parent or other person legally responsible for his care to exercise 
a minimum degree of care . . . .” Id.  
 275. Telephone Interview with Brenda Wahler, Law Office of Brenda 
Wahler (Mar. 22, 2019); E-mail from Bonnie Saltzman, Law Offices of Bonnie 
E. Saltzman, LLC, (July 18, 2019, 7:12 PM EST) (on file with author); E-mail 
from Michael Agranoff, Law Office of Michael Agranoff (Mar. 13, 2019, 3:21 
PM EST) (on file with author). 
 276. See ANTONIO ROBISON ET AL., WITNESS PREPARATION—ETHICAL, 
PRACTICAL, AND COMMON SENSE CONSIDERATIONS 1–5 (2017), 
https://perma.cc/WUQ7-5M2M (PDF) (highlighting the importance of witness 
preparation in the context of depositions, hearings, and arbitrations). 
 277. See, e.g., Jake Gilbreath, Health Records in Child Custody Cases, THE 
WALTERS GILBREATH, PLLC BLOG (July 4, 2019), https://perma.cc/G66D-TDQK 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2020) (noting that physical and mental health records are 
not necessarily protected by HIPAA and state rules of evidence) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 278. See Herma Hill Kay & Irving Philips, Poverty and the Law of Child 
Custody, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 717, 726–39 (1966) (discussing how poverty 
influences child custody decisions). 
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all-important credibility determination, is vulnerable to the 
effects of bias.279  
Failing to provide a list of free legal service providers in 
notice letters places individuals at a high risk of erroneous 
deprivation. As discussed above, since the vast majority of 
individuals on the registry cannot afford an attorney, simply 
informing individuals that they have a right to counsel is not 
meaningful. Studies suggest that many low-income Americans 
do not seek out legal assistance for their civil legal needs 
because they do not know where to look or they do not believe 
that free legal help exists.280 The probable value of providing a 
list of free legal service providers is high. While civil legal 
organizations may not be able to provide representation at every 
hearing, these organizations can provide basic advice about the 
notice letter and explain the value of an administrative 
hearing.281  
Notice letters should clearly state that a person has a right 
to consult and be represented by an attorney in an 
administrative hearing and provide a list of free legal service 
providers who may be available to assist those who cannot 
afford an attorney. In certain states, civil legal service 
organizations may be able to answer questions about the 
administrative appeal process.282 The State’s interest does not 
outweigh the private interest because there is no cost to adding 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 279. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982) (noting that, in the 
context of termination of parental rights proceedings, parents facing child 
abuse investigations are vulnerable to judgments based on cultural or class 
bias because they are often poor, uneducated, and members of minority 
groups). 
 280. According to a recent report on civil legal needs, low-income 
Americans do not seek legal help for eighty percent of their civil legal 
problems. Those who do not seek help report concerns about the cost of such 
help, not being sure if their issues are legal in nature, and not knowing where 
to look for help. LEGAL SERV. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP REPORT: MEASURING THE 
UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 29–33 (2017), 
https://perma.cc/32WK-TZAP (PDF). 
 281. Civil legal service offices provide free counsel regarding a wide range 
of administrative hearings, such as termination of unemployment insurance 
and social security benefits. There are an estimated 900 civil legal aid 
programs across the country and 900 pro bono programs through the 
American Bar Association. Id. at 79. 
 282. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 24.301–24.306 (West 2019) 
(detailing Michigan’s judicial review process as defined by the Administrative 
Procedures Act of 1969). 
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additional information to notice letters. Furthermore, states 
provide this information in notice letters for other 
administrative hearings that frequently involve indigent 
litigants.283 
3. Abolish or Extend Statutes of Limitation for Challenging 
Inclusion on Registry 
Most states currently require individuals to respond to the 
notice letter and file a request for a hearing within a very short 
time frame. At least six states require action within a mere ten 
to fifteen days after notice is received.284 Most states require 
individuals to file a request within one to three months of 
receiving notice.285 There are states, however, that diverge: 
Nebraska does not set a time frame to request a hearing but 
instead allows an appeal to be taken “[a]t any time subsequent 
to completion of the investigation . . . .”286 A number of states 
allow hearings to be granted for requests made after the 
deadline if good cause is shown.287  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 283. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 22(12)(d) (McKinney 2019) (requiring 
the state to inform appellants of the availability of community legal services 
in hearings regarding the termination of public assistance). 
 284. See ALA. CODE § 26-14-7.1 (2019) (giving an individual ten days to 
request a hearing); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-183 (West 2019) (same); MINN. STAT. 
§ 626.556(10i) (2019) (fifteen days); NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 432B.170 (2019) 
(same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4916a (West 2019) (fourteen days); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 48.981 (West 2019) (ten days). 
 285. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-908 (West 2019) (giving an 
individual thirty days to request a hearing); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7.16 
(West 2019) (sixty days); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-33-26-89(c) (West 2020) (thirty 
days); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.152 (West 2018) (sixty days); MONT. ADMIN. R. 
37.47.602 (2019) (thirty days); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 3A:5-2.5 (2019) (twenty 
days); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 424-8(a)(i) (McKinney 2019) (ninety days); 23 PA. 
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 6341(a)(2) (2019) (ninety days); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 62A-4a-1009 (West 2019) (thirty days); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1515 (2019) 
(thirty days). 
 286. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-723 (2019). 
 287. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §722.627(6) (West 2019) (hearing 
may be granted for “good cause shown” if within sixty days after 180 day notice 
period expires); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-1009(3)(e) (West 2019) (request 
may be granted after thirty days if person requesting can show good cause and 
show why response was “unreasonably burdensome” during that time); COLO. 
CODE REGS. § 2509-2:7.111(E) (2019) (hearing may be granted outside ninety 
days if “good cause” shown). These grace periods do require additional 
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When these current short deadlines are enforced, the risk 
of erroneous deprivation is high. In Nebraska, where 
individuals are permitted to appeal “at any time,” they often do 
so several years after first receiving notice of their inclusion in 
the registry—and win.288 For example, in 2015, the Nebraska 
Department of Health and Human Services (NDHHS) received 
approximately eighty percent of its total requests for hearings 
more than one year after notice was effectuated.289 In fact, the 
majority of hearing requests were filed more than five years 
after the parents on the registry received notice.290 Nebraska 
has a remarkably high reversal rate: hearings were resolved in 
favor of the petitioner registrant in thirty out of thirty-nine 
administrative hearings held in 2016.291 The data from 
Nebraska suggests that many individuals who cannot appeal 
their inclusion in state registries because they failed to do so 
within the brief and arbitrary period set by their state’s scheme 
may, in fact, have valid claims for expungement.292  
The reasons that individuals may not effectuate their rights 
if limited to only brief periods within which to act are myriad. 
Practical obstacles may deter parents with valid claims from 
filing a request. In states that only allow requests within five or 
fifteen days, a busy parent may fail to even read the letter before 
the deadline expires. Short statutes of limitations pose a major 
hurdle for parents who often do not understand the notice letter 
and need time to contact a lawyer who can explain the 
process.293 Even if parents fully understand the letter and 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
administrative resources to determine whether an exemption should be 
granted. 
 288. NEB. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, COPY OF CENT. REGISTRY 
2015–2016 DATA (2018) (on file with author). 
 289. According to public records data received from NDHHS, the agency 
received a total of 682 expungement requests in 2015. NDHHS only received 
135 requests within a year of notice. NDHHS received ninety-one within one 
to two years, sixty within two to three years, forty-five within three to four 
years, thirty-four within four to five years, and 317 requests after more than 
five years. NEB. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 288. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
 293. See KRAMER, supra note 155. Other practitioners have shared stories 
about clients who bring the notice letter to their office after thirty days and 
must be told that it is too late to appeal their registry status. 
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process, they still may forfeit valid claims simply because they 
do not understand the value of appealing their administrative 
finding based on the information provided to them and their 
current life circumstances. Circumstances change, however, 
and parents may realize months or even years down the line 
that their inclusion in the registry poses a barrier to their 
long-term goals, such as public employment or higher education. 
The fact that an overwhelming majority of Nebraska parents 
appeal their registry status after five years suggests that this is 
so. Additionally, parents who also have court petitions filed 
against them often may be overwhelmed by fighting their case 
in court and may fail to respond to the notice letter because their 
attention is focused on the immediate crisis in their family.  
States should abolish, or at the very least drastically 
extend, the time period during which a parent or listed 
individual may request an administrative hearing seeking to 
have their name removed from the registry. States can adopt 
similar language to Nebraska’s statute, which allows 
expungement requests to be filed “[a]t any time subsequent to 
completion of the investigation . . . .”294 Any additional burden 
this change would impose on the states in the form of more 
frequent hearings may be outweighed by the state’s interest in 
reducing the number of false positives included in its child abuse 
and neglect registry.295 It is also important to understand the 
relative scale of this administrative and fiscal burden: even if 
each of the estimated 50,000 people added each year to the 
registry in New York296 filed an appeal, the number of hearing 
requests would pale in comparison to the more than 213,000 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 294. NEB. REV. ST. ANN. § 28-723 (2019). 
 295. See Lee TT v. Dowling, 664 N.E.2d 1243, 1251 (N.Y. 1996) 
(“Enhancing procedural protections to protect private interests . . . may serve 
the State’s interest in other ways by reducing the number of false negative 
findings.”); see also Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory 
Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 96 YALE L. J. 455, 
476–78 (1986) (discussing the “accuracy value” of procedural due process as 
well as the dignity value of participation). The state’s interest is also discussed 
in Part III.A.2.c, supra. 
 296. See KRAMER, supra note 155, at 2, 6 (describing the estimated 50,000 
people added to the registry in 2017, despite the State receiving fewer than 
9,300 requests for removal). 
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requests filed for public assistance hearings each year.297 For 
states that maintain smaller registries, such as Pennsylvania, 
where fewer than 5,000 reports are added each year,298 this 
fiscal burden is even lighter.299 To reduce costs, these requests 
can be evaluated more closely at the administrative review 
stage300 or settled prior to a hearing.301 Given the high cost to 
parents of erroneous inclusion, states should not tolerate a short 
deadline that cuts off recourse for people whose names do not 
belong on the registry.302 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 297. See N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF TEMP. AND DISABILITY ASSISTANCE, 2018 
ANNUAL REPORT 17 (2018), https://perma.cc/BBS8-JQ6J (PDF) (“The 
office . . . performs administrative hearings on behalf of other agencies and 
processed more than 213,000 requests for hearings last year.”). 
 298. From 2012–2017, Pennsylvania has routinely added fewer than 5,000 
reports of child abuse and neglect per year to the state registry. PA. DEP’T OF 
HUMAN SERVS., 2017 ANNUAL CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES REPORT 4 (2017), 
https://perma.cc/U5QU-N5ZF (PDF). 
 299. See id. at 29 (discussing Pennsylvania’s low levels of funding required 
to investigate child abuse, relative to the total local, state, and federal funding 
for child welfare services in the state). 
 300. Almost every state requires the agency to immediately conduct an 
administrative review, which consists of a department official examining the 
investigation record and determining internally if the report is unfounded. 
See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 422(8) (McKinney 2019) (establishing the 
requirements at the administrative review stage for New York child abuse 
investigations); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6341 (2019) (describing the process for 
expungement or amendment of records from the child abuse database in 
Pennsylvania by the Secretary of Human Services). According to practitioners, 
the administrative review stage is severely underutilized and rarely results in 
an overturned finding. See KATHERYN D. KATZ, 4 CHILD CUSTODY AND 
VISITATION § 31.03 (Matthew Bender ed., 2019) (“Although there are 
procedures for administrative review for individuals seeking to have the 
record expunged, if there is some credible evidence and the allegations are 
reasonably related to child care, the report will not be expunged.”). 
 301. See, e.g., Doyle v. Camelot Care Ctrs., Inc., 160 F. Supp. 2d 891, 898 
(2001) (describing a settlement agreement between the state and the accused 
that led to an expungement of a child abuse report). 
 302. See Kate Hollenbeck, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Child Abuse 
Registries at the Intersection of Child Protection, Due Process, and Equal 
Protection, 11 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 23 (2001) (“[M]ost courts agree that being 
listed on an employer-accessible child abuse registry does implicate an 
individual’s due process rights to both employment and reputation.”). 
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4. Evidentiary Hearings 
If a parent receives proper notice and files a timely appeal, 
she is entitled to an opportunity to be heard to challenge her 
inclusion in the registry.303 Almost every state requires the 
agency first to conduct an administrative review, consisting of a 
department official examining the investigation record and 
determining internally if the initial determination is 
well-founded.304 If the department official declines to remove the 
report, the parent then may proceed to an administrative 
hearing before a hearing officer or ALJ.305 The hearing officer 
serves as an impartial arbiter.306 In the hearing, the parent and 
the child protective agency each have an opportunity to present 
witnesses and documentary evidence to support their case.307 
The rules of evidence are relaxed and hearsay is often 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 303. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 422(8)(a)(i) (stipulating the right of 
the accused to request the commissioner to amend the report, and 
subsequently request a fair hearing to review the child abuse report); 23 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 6341 (“[I]f the secretary refuses a request . . . the 
perpetrator . . . shall have the right to appeal and request a hearing before the 
secretary to amend or expunge an indicated report on the grounds that it is 
inaccurate . . . .”). 
 304. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 422(8)(a)(ii) (establishing the process 
by which the Office of Children and Family Services will review the report by 
the investigating agency); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6341(a)(2) (describing the right 
of the accused to request an administrative review by the Secretary prior to 
an administrative hearing). 
 305. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 422(8)(b) (providing the accused with 
an opportunity for a fair hearing with the burden of proof on the state); 23 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 6341(c) (listing the hearing process requirements before an ALJ 
or hearing officer in the event of a refusal to amend or expunge by the 
Secretary). 
 306. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 434.6 (2019) (“The 
hearing must be conducted by an impartial hearing officer who is employed by 
the department for that purpose and who has not been involved in any way 
with the action in question.”); ALA. CODE § 26-14-7.1(7) (2019) (“The alleged 
perpetrator shall have . . . [t]he right to have a hearing officer appointed who 
shall be disinterested, fair, and impartial.”). 
 307. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 434.8(d) (“Each party 
is entitled . . . to have witnesses give testimony and to otherwise have relevant 
and material evidence presented on his or her behalf . . . .”); ALA. CODE 
§ 26-14-7.1(7) (2019) (“The alleged perpetrator shall have . . . [t]he right to 
present written evidence, oral testimony, and witnesses.”). 
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permitted.308 As discussed above, the petitioner is often expected 
to testify on her own behalf. Almost every state provides a right 
to appeal the hearing officer’s decision to a court of competent 
jurisdiction.309 
The number of registry hearings held each year varies by 
state. In New York and Georgia, states with large populations, 
two to three thousand hearings are currently held per year.310 
Nebraska, a state with a population under two million,311 holds 
fewer than fifty hearings per year.312 Even in the most populous 
states, the number of registry hearings pales in comparison to 
the number of hearings held relating to other administrative 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 308. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 434.8(e) (“Technical 
rules of evidence following in a court of law will not apply but evidence 
introduced must be relevant and material.”). 
 309. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-183(f) (West 2019) (requiring appeals 
be brought to the superior court of the county); MO. REV. STAT. § 210.152.6 
(2018) (permitting de novo judicial review in the county circuit court); N.J. 
ADMIN. CODE § 3A:5-2.8 (2019) (providing judicial review authority to the 
Appellate Division of Superior Court); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6341(g) 
(requiring appeals be brought to the Commonwealth Court). While rarely 
used, this right to appeal can provide parties with meaningful recourse. See 
also, e.g., Letter from Judy D. Holdaway, Ga. Dep’t of Family & Children 
Servs. Deputy Gen. Counsel 3 (Sept. 7, 2018) (on file with author) (providing 
information on the Georgia Child Protective Services Information System). 
For example, in Georgia, of the twenty-one cases that were appealed to the 
Superior Court in 2017, eleven were overturned on appeal. Id. 
 310. According to public records gathered from the New York Office of 
Children and Family Services, 3,829 hearings were held in 2016. See Letter 
from Craig Sunkes, New York Office of Children and Family Services Records 
Access Officer 2 (June 8, 2018) (stating the number of fair hearings that 
occurred in 2016 in New York State) (on file with author). According to public 
records gathered from Georgia Department of Human Services, 2,698 hearings 
were held in 2017. Holdaway, supra note 309, at 3. 
 311. In 2018, the estimated state population of Nebraska was 
approximately two million. See Resident Population in Nebraska, FED. RES. 
BANK OF ST. LOUIS, https://perma.cc/P7SE-LMUE (last updated Feb. 15, 2019) 
(last visited Dec. 21, 2019) (providing Nebraska population data) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 312. According to public records gathered from Nebraska Department of 
Health and Human Services, only thirty-nine hearings were held in 2016. See 
E-mail from Jaime L. Hegr, Neb. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. Attorney 
(July 13, 2018) (on file with author) (providing data regarding child abuse 
registry hearings in Nebraska). 
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determinations, such as hearings challenging public assistance 
determinations.313  
We recommend the following practical reforms to ensure 
that hearings are conducted in a manner that comports with due 
process, based on best practices seen in states around the 
country. 
a. Disclosure and Compulsion of Evidence 
Currently, most states either do not discuss the individual’s 
rights at the hearing in their statute314 or provide the agency 
responsible for handling the hearings with discretion to decide 
these critical rights.315 When states delegate this task to 
agencies, states run the risk that agencies will only provide a 
few basic rights, such as the right to present and cross-examine 
witnesses.316 
States should ensure that parents are afforded certain 
minimum due process protections during their hearings. States 
can follow the model of Pennsylvania and Alabama, which 
provide certain key rights, such as the right to automatic and 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 313. For example, in New York, 13,023 hearings were held for denial of 
public assistance in 2016–2017. See N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF TEMP. AND 
DISABILITY ASSISTANCE, 2017 STATISTICAL REPORT ON THE OPERATIONS OF NEW 
YORK STATE PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 55 (2017), 
https://perma.cc/VA2H-GJBW (PDF) (providing data on hearings for public 
assistance for 2016–2017 in the New York state). 
 314. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 422(8) (McKinney 2019) (providing 
little stipulated protection of the accused’s rights at the hearing); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 49-5-183(d) (West 2019) (same). 
 315. Mississippi’s statute provided this level of discretion prior to 2019. 
See MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-257(3) (2003) (“The Department of Human 
Services shall adopt such rules and administrative procedures, especially 
those procedures to afford due process to individuals who have been named as 
substantiated perpetrators before the release of their name from the central 
registry, as may be necessary to carry out this subsection.”). 
 316. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 434.8(d) (2019) 
Each party is entitled to be represented by an attorney or other 
representative of his or her choice, to have witnesses give testimony 
and to otherwise have relevant and material evidence presented on 
his or her behalf, to cross-examine opposing witnesses, to offer 
rebuttal evidence and to examine any document or item offered into 
evidence. 
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complete disclosure of evidence prior to the hearing317 and the 
right for individuals to ask for subpoenas to compel witnesses to 
attend the hearing.318  
Without the right to automatic disclosure of evidence, the 
risk of erroneous deprivation is high.319 Agency counsel has a 
strategic advantage over petitioners in cross-examination 
because they can review the full notes of the child protective 
investigation, including harmful statements from out-of-court 
witnesses, prior to the hearing.320 Since hearsay is generally 
permitted, agency counsel can surprise parents on the stand 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 317. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6341(c) (2019) (“The department or county 
agency shall provide a person making an appeal with evidence gathered 
during the child abuse investigation within its possession that is relevant to 
the child abuse determination . . . .”); see also ALA. CODE § 26-14-7.1(7)(f) 
(2019) 
The alleged perpetrator shall have . . . the right to inspect any 
exculpatory evidence which may be in the possession of 
departmental investigators, and the right to be informed of such 
evidence if known by departmental investigators before the 
hearing; provided, that a request for such evidence is made at least 
five working days prior to the date set for the hearing. 
While both Pennsylvania and Alabama recognize the need to provide 
individuals with critical information about the child protective investigation 
prior to the hearing, Pennsylvania’s statute provides a more straightforward 
process for pro se litigants and agency counsel. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6341(c); 
ALA. CODE § 26-14-7.1(7)(f). First, the statute mandates automatic disclosure. 
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6341(c). This is preferable for pro se litigants who may 
not be aware of the right to file a request for exculpatory evidence or may not 
file it within the right time frame. Id. Second, the statute simply requires 
agency counsel to send the entire packet of case records to the individual on 
the registry. Id. This is a more efficient procedure for agency counsel because 
it does not require them to make a determination of what qualifies as 
“exculpatory” evidence for the purposes of the hearing. Id. 
 318. See ALA. CODE § 26-14-7.1(7)(i) (“The alleged perpetrator shall 
have . . . the right to request issuance of subpoenas to witnesses and compel 
attendance. This request must be received no later than ten calendar days 
prior to the hearing, unless a shorter time is agreed upon by the hearing 
officer.”). 
 319. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 
(1951) (“[F]airness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination 
of facts decisive of rights. . . .”); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) 
(“Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is 
essential to proper litigation.”). 
 320. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 434.8 (providing no 
opportunity for petitioners to obtain the documents prior to entrance into 
evidence at a hearing). 
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with witness statements that the parent could not reasonably 
have anticipated. A damaging cross-examination can lead a 
hearing officer to make an erroneous determination about the 
parent’s credibility. The probable value of full disclosure is high 
because it allows the parent to adequately prepare direct 
testimony to address the possible motives and bias of the 
witness. Allowing individuals to have a fair opportunity to 
address witness bias is particularly critical for child abuse and 
neglect reports, which “often occur in a context with no 
disinterested witnesses,”321 such as former partners and family 
members. 
Without the right to issue subpoenas to compel witnesses to 
attend hearings, the right of erroneous deprivation also is 
high.322 While parents have a right to present witnesses to 
support their case, parents face unique barriers to conducting 
their own independent investigation because of the stigma 
associated with being accused of abuse or neglect in the 
community.323 Take the example of an allegation against a 
parent of a child coming to school unclean.324 The key witness in 
this case may be a teacher who observed the child and called in 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 321. Molly Greer, Note, Suggestions to Solve the Injustices of the New York 
State Central Register for Abuse and Maltreatment, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. 
POL’Y 729, 764 (2011); see also Phillips, supra note 23, at 188–89 (“Providing 
the accused an opportunity to confront and cross-examine the informant solves 
the problem of bad faith or erroneous testimony most effectively.”). 
 322. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 434.8 (providing no 
subpoena authority to the accused). Cf. Jamison v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 218 
S.W.3d 399, 416–17 (Mo. 2007) (denying the state subpoena power to compel 
abuse reporters or victims to testify, when the accused were statutorily denied 
the same right, given the result would be an unfair trial and a failure to meet 
the minimal standards of due process). But see supra note 318 and 
accompanying text. 
 323. See Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1000 (2d Cir. 1994) (“There is no 
dispute that [the accused]’s inclusion on the list potentially damages her 
reputation by branding her as a child abuser, which certainly calls into 
question her good name, reputation, honor, or integrity.” (internal citations 
and quotation marks omitted)). 
 324. This is a common allegation of failure to provide adequate clothing 
and hygiene charged under the broader category of “neglect.” See, e.g., N.Y. 
FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(f)(i) (2019) (defining neglect broadly as a child “whose 
physical, mental, or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent 
danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of his parent or other 
person legally responsible for his care to exercise a minimum degree of care”). 
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the report.325 Any parent would feel uncomfortable approaching 
a school professional about a child protective investigation, 
especially if they are still regularly involved in the daily lives of 
their children. Professionals may consider the discussion 
inappropriate and refuse to speak with the parent. The probable 
value of the right to issue subpoenas is high because the 
petitioner could compel this witness to the hearing instead of 
persuading them to testify. If subpoenaed to testify, the parent 
can ask specific questions about the child’s appearance and 
establish that, despite the conclusory language used in the child 
protective investigator’s records, the child was dirty because of 
a fight at recess. 
Both subpoenas and full disclosure of documents can be 
handled at a pre-trial conference, which are already routinely 
held in many jurisdictions to inform parents of their rights and 
to encourage settlement between the two parties prior to the 
hearing.326 States can pay the cost for the sheriff’s office to serve 
the subpoena or ask parties to serve their own subpoenas 
through a disinterested party.327 To accomplish full disclosure, 
agency counsel is only required to copy a packet of records to 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 325. See, e.g., David II. v. Tracy II., 854 N.Y.S.2d 583, 585 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2008) (“[A]nother teacher observed that the child frequently arrived at school 
in an unbathed, disheveled condition, wore unclean clothes and exhibited a 
pervasive urine smell when he entered the classroom.”). 
 326. See E-mail from Bonnie Saltzman, Law Offices of Bonnie E. 
Saltzman, LLC, to author (July 18, 2019, 7:12 PM EST) (describing the 
limitations for releasing administrative findings in Colorado) (on file with 
author); Telephone Interview with Brenda Wahler, Law Office of Brenda 
Wahler (Mar. 22, 2019) (discussing the use of pre-trial conferences by the state 
to settle cases in Montana). 
 327. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-7.1(8) (2019) (“The Department of Human 
Resources or its investigative hearing officers shall have the power and 
authority to issue subpoenas to compel attendance by and production of 
documents from any witness. Subpoenas may be served in the same manner 
as subpoenas issued out of any circuit court.”); ALA. R. CIV. P. 45(b) 
A subpoena issued on behalf of any party may be served by the 
sheriff, a deputy sheriff, or any other person who is not a party, who 
is not related within the third degree by blood or marriage to the 
party seeking service of process, and who is not less than 19 years 
of age or by certified mail pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4. 
(emphasis added). 
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provide to the parent.328 There may be some burden to the state 
in requiring state employees to testify pursuant to subpoenas, 
but this is outweighed by the state’s interest in accurate 
adjudication and the value of offering parents a fair opportunity 
to prepare their case prior to the hearing.329  
b. Raise Burden of Proof at Hearing to “Preponderance of the 
Evidence” 
A majority of states require the child protective agency to 
prove that abuse or neglect occurred by a preponderance of the 
evidence or substantial evidence.330 However, a few states still 
only require the agency to prove their case by the same low 
standard that was used in the caseworker’s initial 
investigation.331  
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 328. See Phillips, supra note 23, at 184 (“The administrative costs of 
evidentiary disclosure are not significant because the state must only copy the 
documents in its possession or otherwise permit access to its evidence.”). 
 329. See id. at 184–85 (weighing the benefits of witness protection against 
the value of knowledge of the identities of the state’s witnesses to the accused). 
 330. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-813 (West 2019) (using a 
preponderance of the evidence standard); COLO. CODE REGS. § 2509-2 (2019) 
(same); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-101k(d)(2) (2019) (same); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
16, § 925A(a) (2019) (same); D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 29, § 5909.7 (2019) (same); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-183(d)(4) (West 2019) (same); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, 
§ 336.115(c)(2)(B) (West 2019) (same); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-33-26-9(b) (West 
2020) (same); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 30-46-10 (2019) (same); LA. ADMIN. CODE 
tit. 67, § 1111(F)(5) (2019) (same); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.627(7) (2019) 
(same); MINN. STAT. § 626.556 (2019) (following standard of proof in all state 
human services hearings, which is preponderance of the evidence under MINN. 
STAT. §256.045(3b)(a) (2019)); MO. REV. STAT. § 210.152(5) (2019) (employing 
a preponderance of the evidence standard); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-723 (2019) 
(“A juvenile court finding of child abuse or child neglect shall be presumptive 
evidence that the report was not unfounded.”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-720(1)(c) 
(2019) (using a preponderance of the evidence standard); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW 
§ 422(8)(c)(ii) (McKinney 2019) (same); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6341(c.2)(5) (2019) 
(using a substantial evidence standard); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-1930 (2019) 
(establishing a preponderance of the evidence standard); S.D. ADMIN. R. 
67:14:39:07 (2019) (same); 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 351.503(e) (2019) (same); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-1009(5)(a) (West 2019) (same); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 63.2-1526(A) (2019) (same); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 110-30-0340 (2020) 
(same); WIS. STAT. § 48.981(3m)(c)(2) (2019) (same). 
 331. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-7.1(11)(a) (referencing when a hearing 
officer determines the allegations are “indicated,” or “[w]hen credible evidence 
and professional judgment substantiates that an alleged perpetrator is 
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States should require the child protective agency to prove 
at the hearing that abuse or neglect occurred by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Without the preponderance of 
the evidence standard at the hearing, the risk of erroneous 
deprivation is high. Several state supreme courts have ruled 
that the preponderance of the evidence standard at the hearing 
is necessary to guard against a high risk of erroneous 
deprivation.332 In fact, most court cases challenging the 
procedures for the child abuse and neglect registry have focused 
on the burden of proof at the hearing as the most troubling 
procedural deficiency. The probable value of using an elevated 
preponderance standard is high because it allows the evidence 
to be weighed carefully by the finder of fact. This is especially 
important in an evidentiary hearing because the hearing officer 
may need to compare and contrast different versions of the same 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
responsible for child abuse or neglect.” (ALA. CODE § 26-14-8 (2019))); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-811(K) (2019) (“On completion of the presentation of 
evidence, the administrative law judge shall determine if probable cause exists 
to sustain the department’s finding that the parent, guardian or custodian 
abused or neglected the child.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4916a(e) (West 2019) 
(“The Department shall have the burden of proving that it has accurately and 
reliably concluded that a reasonable person would believe that the child has 
been abused or neglected by that person.”). 
 332. See, e.g., Cavarretta v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 660 N.E.2d 
250, 258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (“[The Department of Children and Family 
Services (DCFS)] should at least be required to prove its case by a 
preponderance of the evidence. This standard would allow DCFS and the 
subject to share the risk of error, rather than have the accused bear the brunt 
of the risk.”); Jamison v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 218 S.W.3d 399, 412 (Mo. 2007) 
(“Due process requires a [Child Abuse and Neglect Review Board] to 
substantiate a report of child abuse or neglect by a preponderance of the 
evidence before an individual’s name can be included in and disseminated 
from the registry.”); Benitez v. Rasmussen, 626 N.W.2d 209, 218 (Neb. 2001) 
(analyzing a deprivation of liberty without due process in three parts under 
the preponderance of the evidence standard: (1) what liberty interest is at 
stake, (2) “what procedural safeguards are required,” (3) whether there was a 
denial of the process due); In re Preisendorfer, 719 A.2d 590 (N.H. 1998) 
(concluding that the liberty interest in a registry appeal demands the same 
preponderance of the evidence standard required when protecting the liberty 
interest in having a parent-child relationship, balanced against the state 
interest in protecting the safety of children); Lee TT v. Dowling, 664 N.E.2d 
1243, 1252 (N.Y. 1996) (“We conclude that the Due Process Clause of the 
Federal Constitution requires the Department to substantiate reports of child 
abuse by a fair preponderance of the evidence . . . .”). 
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event.333 The state’s interest is low because there is little 
expense associated with this ratcheting up of the burden of 
proof.334 The fact that a clear majority of states employ 
preponderance of the evidence suggests that the state’s interests 
are not compromised by a higher burden of proof at the hearing 
stage. 
c. Automatically Expunge Reports When Court Dismisses 
Petition 
One important feature of child abuse and neglect registry 
systems is that they do not operate in a vacuum. In all states, 
related but separate court proceedings may be held for those 
cases for which the agency determines court intervention is 
needed.335 In these proceedings, the court is tasked with 
determining not only whether abuse or neglect did, in fact, 
occur, but also what should happen to ensure that the child 
remains safe and the family is able to reunify, if at all 
possible.336 An integral feature of these court proceedings is that 
a court of competent jurisdiction—and in many states, a court 
that specializes in child protective matters—must adjudicate 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 333. See Cavarretta v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 660 N.E.2d 250, 
258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (“[T]he credible evidence standard is deficient because 
it does not require the fact finder to weigh conflicting evidence. This is 
especially unfair and unreliable in light of the nature of the testimony and the 
need to compare and contrast different versions of the same event.”); Jamison 
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 218 S.W.3d 399, 411 (Mo. 2007) (“As the probable cause 
standard does not require a balancing of available evidence, it leaves the 
ultimate assessment ‘open to the subjective values’ of the fact finder, thereby 
magnifying the risk of erroneous fact finding.” (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 
455 U.S. 745, 762 (1982))). 
 334. See Jamison, 218 S.W.3d at 411–12 (determining that, while fiscal 
and administrative efficiency are substantial state interests, the state’s 
interest does not outweigh the liberty and property interests of the accused). 
 335. See Glaberson, supra note 64, at 314–15 
The most drastic avenue is to remove the child prior to going to 
court—an action referred to as an “emergency removal.” Short of 
removing the child on an emergency basis, the agency can file a 
petition in the relevant court seeking an order placing the family 
under supervision of the agency, or mandating that the parents 
comply with certain services or conditions to keep their child at 
home. The agency may seek the court’s approval to remove the child 
or children from the home at that time. 
 336. See id. at 313–16 (discussing the ability of state agencies to determine 
a course of action most beneficial to the child and to remedy abuse or neglect). 
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precisely the same question that is asked of the substantiating 
agency: has sufficient evidence been adduced to support the 
allegations made against the parent?337 In an overwhelming 
majority of states, the court will assess this question based on 
the same burden of proof that the ALJ at a registry hearing 
would use: preponderance of the evidence.338 There is reason to 
believe that court-based findings may be more accurate than 
administrative determinations. Judges often review a broader 
array of evidence, and that evidence often must be presented in 
accordance with the rules of evidence, which are geared toward 
ensuring reliability.339 In recognition of this fact, numerous 
states have written into their registry schemes a mechanism to 
avoid duplicative adjudications: many states bar parents from 
taking administrative appeals of their registry inclusion if a 
court makes a finding against them.340 Yet too few state schemes 
employ the reverse procedure, expunging reports when a court 
does not find that abuse or neglect occurred.341 As a result, these 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 337. See id. at 316 (noting that “the court in many states will not yet have 
ruled as to whether . . . the child actually was abused or neglected,” when 
determining what intervention is appropriate, making that determination 
later at a fact-finding hearing). 
 338. Compare, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 422(8)(c)(ii) (McKinney 2019) 
(stating that in an administrative hearing, the Office of Children and Family 
Services must prove abuse or neglect occurred based on a preponderance of 
the evidence), with N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(b) (McKinney 2019) (“In a 
fact-finding hearing: . . . any determination that the child is an abuse or 
neglected child must be based on a preponderance of evidence . . . .”). 
 339. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a) (detailing the admissible forms 
of evidence in a family court hearing). Judges who oversee child protective 
proceedings everyday also have more expertise in interpreting the statutory 
definitions of abuse and neglect than ALJs who often adjudicate a variety of 
issues across agencies. See John L. Gedid, ALJ Ethics: Conundrums, 
Dilemmas, and Paradoxes, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 33, 38 (2002) (“Because ALJs 
are part of an agency that possess specialized expertise, long time association 
with a particular agency and its personnel tends to indoctrinate or inculcate 
into the ALJ ‘the agency culture, viewpoints, and approaches to problems.’” 
(quoting K.G. Jan Pillai, Rethinking Judicial Immunity for the Twenty-First 
Century, 39 HOW. L.J. 95, 125 (1995))). 
 340. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-183(d)(11) (West 2019) (“The doctrines 
of collateral estoppel and res judicata as applied in judicial proceedings shall 
be applicable to the administrative hearings held pursuant to this article.”). 
 341. See, e.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. § 12-18-807 (West 2019) (permitting the 
prevailing party in a judicial adjudication to file a certified copy of the judicial 
adjudication to the Office of Appeals and Hearings and requiring the office to 
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states force individuals to appeal their reports even when a 
court already has found that no abuse or neglect occurred.342 
States should automatically expunge a report from the 
registry if a petition based on that report is dismissed in a court 
of law. This scheme would mirror the automatic sealing of 
records that is commonplace in criminal court. For example, in 
New York, when a criminal action is resolved in favor of the 
accused, the clerk of court immediately notifies the 
commissioner of the Division of Criminal Justice Services and 
other relevant agencies that the record, including the arrest 
record, shall be sealed.343 Automatic sealing occurs not only with 
acquittals after trial, but also when a defendant successfully 
completes a plea agreement resulting in dismissal.344 The state’s 
interest in forcing the parent to litigate their registry appeal 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
determine if the adjudication has preclusive effect “by applying the principles 
of claim preclusion and issue preclusion”). 
 342. See, e.g., Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Salcido, 567 S.W.3d 510, 515 
(Ark. Ct. App. 2018) (dismissing an appeal by a parent for failure to report the 
final disposition of the Office of Appeals and Hearings’ determination). 
 343. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 160.50 (McKinney 2019) (requiring 
expungement of records upon dismissal or election not to prosecute). This 
process is automatic and if the District Attorney objects, the onus is on the 
State to file a motion and demonstrate that the interests of justice require 
otherwise. See id. (“[U]nless the district attorney upon 
motion . . . demonstrates to the satisfaction of the court that the interests of 
justice require otherwise . . . .”). 
 344. See id. §160.50(3) (“No defendant shall be required or permitted to 
waive eligibility for sealing or expungement pursuant to this section as part of 
a plea of guilty . . . .”). Petitions can also be dismissed in court when the state 
has decided that the parent has rectified any concerns in the home, generally 
when the allegations are minor, and the parent has successfully completed 
recommended services. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1051(c) (McKinney 2019) 
(“If facts sufficient to sustain the petition under this article are not 
established, or if, in a case of alleged neglect, the court concludes that its aid 
is not required . . . the court shall dismiss the petition and shall state on the 
record the grounds for the dismissal.” (emphasis added)). In the case of a 
report where the alleged abuse or neglect did occur, but the family did services 
and rectified the situation, the state may desire to retain the report for 
diagnostic purposes. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-311(b) (2019) (“This data 
shall be furnished by county directors of social services to the Department of 
Health and Human Services and shall be confidential . . . .”). For these 
circumstances, the state could maintain a registry accessible only to child 
welfare agencies. Id. 
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after receiving a favorable disposition in a court of law is low.345 
If Family Court has found no abuse or neglect occurred after an 
adjudicatory hearing on the merits, the only result of requiring 
a duplicative administrative procedure is waste.346 
Automatic expungement is a practical cost-saving measure 
for the state, reducing the number of administrative appeals 
and hearings per year.347 States can adopt provisions that 
provide for prompt expungement of reports if a petition arising 
from the report has been dismissed by order of a court in a child 
protective proceeding. Indiana and Hawaii have such 
provisions, which can serve as a guide.348 Some states already 
recognize court findings as presumptive evidence at the 
administrative hearing, but stop short of automatic 
expungement.349 This provision should include not only a 
finding of no abuse or neglect after an adjudicatory hearing, but 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 345. As noted above, the state interest in lower evidentiary requirements 
does not supersede the liberty and property interests of the parent. In the case 
where the state could not substantiate the claims of abuse, the state’s interest 
should be even lower. See supra note 332 and accompanying text. 
 346. Given that a vast majority of hearings on expungement result in 
reversal, automatic expungement for unsubstantiated claims would likely 
remove a great majority of the judicial and administrative burden. See supra 
notes 163–164 and accompanying text. 
 347. Without the expense of duplicative hearings, the states may partially 
offset the expense of the greater number of hearings that results from 
expanding the time frame for requests. See supra Part III.B.3. 
 348. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-2(d) (2019) (“The 
department . . . shall promptly expunge the reports in cases if . . . (2) the 
petition arising from the report has been dismissed by order of the family court 
after an adjudicatory hearing on the merits pursuant to chapter 587A.”); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 31-33-26-15(a) (West 2020) (“The Department shall expunge a 
substantiated report contained within the index not later than ten (10) 
working days after any of the following occurs: (1) a court having jurisdiction 
over a child in need of services proceeding determines that child abuse or 
neglect has not occurred . . . .”). 
 349. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 434.10(f) (McKinney 
2019) (“A Family Court finding . . . that a child has been abused or neglected 
is presumptive evidence that the report of child abuse and maltreatment 
maintained by the [state registry] concerning such child is substantiated by a 
fair preponderance of the evidence if the allegations are the same.”); see also 
Mich. Att’y Gen., Opinion Letter (Apr. 28, 1978), 1978 Mich. AG LEXIS 126 
(“The obverse of this statement is therefore equally true; that is, a finding by 
a court of competent jurisdiction that there was no neglect or abuse raises a 
presumption that the report or record was not substantiated and must 
therefore, be amended or expunged.”). 
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also any dispositions or settlements that result in a dismissal of 
the petition.350  
IV. Conclusion 
The right to family integrity is fundamental. When 
individuals are included in statewide registries purporting to 
compile allegations of child maltreatment, this right is 
infringed. By focusing on employment consequences of registry 
inclusion and ignoring the impacts on individuals’ right to 
parent, current jurisprudence and scholarship sets the due 
process scale to the wrong balance. This Article demonstrates 
that the balance must tip in order to protect families, and has 
suggested a number of common-sense reforms that, if 
implemented, will serve to protect families and lead to better 




 350. For example, in New York, many cases do not proceed to fact-finding 
but the petition is dismissed. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1051(c) (McKinney 2019) 
(“If facts sufficient to sustain the petition under this article are not 
established, or if, in a case of alleged neglect, the court concludes that its aid 
is not required . . ., the court shall dismiss the petition and shall state on the 
record the grounds for the dismissal.”). Many other cases do not proceed after 
successful completion of a suspended judgement. See id. § 1053 (permitting 
the court to “define permissible terms and conditions” for allowing a 
suspended judgment for up to one year in most cases). Similarly, the court has 
the power to vacate a finding. See id. § 1061 (“For good cause shown and after 
due notice, the court on its own motion . . . may . . . vacate any order issued in 
the course of a proceeding under this article.”). 
